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Preface 
Hundreds or even thousands of international legal instruments on "the environment" 
are in existence. What happens to international environmental agreements once they are 
signed, and how does the process of implementing such agreements influence their 
effectiveness? These are the questions that motivate the IIASA project "Implementation 
and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (IEC)". Research teams 
are examining these questions from many angles and with different methods. 
In this paper, Marc Levy, Oran Young and Michael Ziirn survey the literature on 
international "regimes". Regimes are social institutions that influence the behavior of 
states and their subjects. They consist of informal and formalized principles and norms, 
as well as specific rules and procedures. The term is explicitly broad and captures the 
unwritten understandings and relationships, as well as the formal legal agreements, that 
influence how states and individuals behave in any given issue-area. Scholarship over 
the last decade has elaborated how regimes are formed; this paper surveys that work and 
focuses on more recent scholarship that has turned from the formation of regimes to the 
question of what makes regimes "effective". 
The paper is one foundation for IEC's effort to build a database about the 
characteristics of international regimes. The database will consist of key variables related 
to the formation and implementation of international agreements and will allow systematic 
use of historical evidence from a large number of cases. The goal is to make possible the 
testing of hypotheses and the drawing of general conclusions about which variables are 
causally linked to "effectiveness". Existing research has led to hypotheses and tests based 
on single case studies or small samples of cases, but conclusions have been difficult to 
generalize to other cases because variables are left uncontrolled and the social processes 
are complex. In contrast, the IEC effort will include all the major variables related to 
effectiveness. The team will employ experts in each case to perform the coding, thus 
allowing for assessments (including subjective evaluations) of a wide range of data. 
The team is now preparing and testing a data protocol, as well as a manual that 
describes the major questions in the data protocol and how they should be answered. The 
protocol and manual will refine the variables we are coding and their relationship to 
major hypotheses. 
The context of this paper in the IEC project 
This paper is one of several IEC working papers that survey the existing literature, 
place the project in a framework of prior research, and identify the major questions that 
deserve further study. At the outset, members of the project decided to prepare these 
papers to ensure that we were adequately aware of other research in the field and, 
especially, to ensure that we would be studying the most important questions in the 
proper context. The papers that play these roles are listed below, divided into each of the 
three areas of IEC's research program. Fuller descriptions of different parts of IEC's 
research program are available in the IEC project description (copies available from IEC) 
and in the prefaces and working papers listed below. 
1. Historical case-study and comparative research 
Most of IEC's research is directed at studying how international environmental 
agreements have been implemented historically through examination of case- 
studies and focussed comparisons among selected cases. Teams are studying 
domestic implementation as well as international and transnational processes. 
Eight papers review the relevant literature and establish the context and 
research questions: 
Research on implementation at the domestic level in Western Europe and 
in the Eastern economies undergoing transformation: 
o Steinar Andresen, Jon Birger Skjarseth, and Jmgen Wettestad, 
1994, "Regime, the State and Society--Analysing the 
Implementation of International Environmental Commitments". 
o Vladimir Kotov, 1994, "Implementation and Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Regimes During the Process of 
Economic Transformation in Russia". 
o Elena Nikitina, 1994, "Domestic Implementation of International 
Environmental Commitments: a Review of Soviet Literature". 
o Alexei Roginko, 1994, "Domestic Compliance with International 
Environmental Agreements: a Review of Current Literature". 
Research on international and transnational processes of implementation: 
o David G. Victor with Owen J. Greene, John Lanchbery, Juan 
Carlos di Primio and Anna Korula, 1994, "Roles of Review 
Mechanisms in the Effective Implementation of International 
Environmental Agreements". 
o David G. Victor, John Lanchbery and Owen Greene, 1994, "An 
Empirical Study of Review Mechanisms: Report on Work in 
Progress". 
o David G. Victor with Anna Korula, 1994, "What Is an 
International Environmental Agreement?" 
o Owen J. Greene, 1994, "On Verifiability, and How It Could 
Matter for International Environmental Agreements". 
2. Development of a database 
IEC is developing a database that will consist of key variables related to the 
development and effective implementation of international agreements. It will 
allow systematic use of historical evidence from a large number of cases. The 
goal is to make possible the testing of hypotheses and the drawing of general 
conclusions about which variables are causally linked to "effectiveness". One 
paper reviews the major hypotheses related to the formation and effectiveness 
of international regimes: 
o Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Ziirn, 1994, "The 
Study of International Regimes". 
3. Other research and policy activities 
IEC researchers are applying their research findings to current and future 
policy issues as opportunities arise. The project is also sponsoring a major 
simulation-gaming exercise to explore issues of institutional design, 
implementation and compliance in international environmental agreements. 
Simulations can help promote creative thinking about political options for 
international management of climate change, identify potential pitfalls, 
integrate policy-relevant knowledge from a variety of domains, and identify 
important policy-relevant knowledge needs. One paper surveys the benefits of 
using simulation-gaming as a policy and research tool: 
o Edward A. Parson, 1995, "Why Study Hard Policy Problems With 
Simulation-Gaming?" 
The above list includes only the papers that the project has used in establishing the 
framework for its research activities. A complete list of publications and copies of papers 
are available from the IEC ofices at IIASA. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
More than a decade after the publication of the well-known special issue of 
International Orgunization on regimes, the study of international institutions is alive and well. 
Perhaps the best proof lies in the length of this state-of-the-art report. Although a number of 
assessments of research on international regimes have appeared during the last decade, most 
confine their attention to certain aspects of international instituti0ns.l The excellent contribution 
of Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons (1987), for instance, focuses on studies of regime 
formation (see also Efrnger et al. 1991). The most recent contributions of this kind are more 
comprehensive in that they consider both regime formation and regime consequences. Even so, 
they address work done in specific academic communities (Rittberger 1993, Keohane 1993) or 
in the context of specific projects (e.g. Haas, Keohane, and Levy, eds., 1993, Mayer, Rittberger, 
and Ziirn 1993, Young and Osherenko, eds., 1993). In this report, by contrast, we seek to make a 
more comprehensive evaluation, placing particular emphasis on recent developments and on 
future directions in research on international regimes. As will become apparent, research efforts 
in this field are shifting toward regime consequences in contrast to regime formation. They also 
make increasing use of theoretical insights drawn from analytic constructs outside the realm of 
rational choice models. 
These developments in regime analysis reflect two underlying concerns that drive 
research on international institutions. The original analytic concern of regime analysis was to 
demonstrate, against neo-realist claims, that institutions are a necessary ingredient of any theory 
of world politics. Today, this general point is more or less accepted, and the open questions are 
more specific: how do institutions affect world politics, how do institutions (including their 
formation) interact with actors (including their interest formation), and what are the independent 
consequences of regimes? The original normative concern, by contrast, was a desire to 
understand the consequences for the international economic order of a relative decline in 
American dominance. Although we now know that international regimes can form and become 
effective in the absence of a hegemon, the open questions are: how can new international 
institutions direct actor behavior in desired directions in various issue areas, how can 
international regimes foster learning on the part of participating actors, and how can 
international institutions restructure domestic institutions? In this connection, many recent 
studies focus on international environmental regimes, an area conducive to the analysis of the 
new analytical and normative concerns underlying regime analysis. 
This report reflects these recent developments in regime analysis. In this sense, it 
may appear that the examples we use to illustrate theoretical arguments are unbalanced in one 
way or another. At the same time, the report is more balanced than previous surveys in covering 
the four sets of questions driving most research on international institutions: 
* Under what conditions and through what mechanisms (why and how) do 
international regimes come into existence? Can institutions form in the absence of a power 
monopoly and without the participation of a hegemon? Is it possible for international regimes to 
come into existence when they are needed or do they emerge only in special situations? What 
1 In their essay eloquently entitled "International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State," 
Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie provide an intellectual history of the development of research on 
international organizations rather than a report on the study of international regimes. 
kinds of processes lead to the formation of international regimes? Do different types of regimes 
follow different paths of regime formation? 
* Do regimes persist even when the circumstances in which they came into existence 
change? To what extent are they independent of the exogenous forces that form them? Are 
regimes robust enough to survive a deterioration of the overall relationship among the 
participants and, at the same time, flexible enough to adapt to changes? What mechanisms give 
regimes independence and robustness? Are regimes featuring specific attributes more persistent 
and robust than others? What makes some regimes more flexible than others? 
* What consequences of regimes for state behavior and problem solving can we 
observe? Do regimes serve the goals that led to their creation? What stated goals do regimes 
usually espouse? Are the stated goals indeed those that are pursued? Under what conditions do 
regimes make a difference? Are certain types of regimes more conducive to goal attainment than 
others? Through what mechanisms do regimes influence outcomes? 
* What long-term effects on national political systems and the structure of world 
politics do regimes have? Why and how do such effects occur? Are individual participants aware 
of these long-term consequences? What are the consequences of regimes with regard to 
traditional notions of democracy? How do they affect social and political constellations in the 
participating countries? Do regimes play a civilizing role in world politics, and if so, how? 
Although these four sets of questions are clearly interrelated, answering them may 
require different strategies of inquiry. In this sense, regime analysis may be less straightforward 
and focused than is usually assumed. Yet the different strands of regime analysis are 
complementary in that we must provide satisfactory answers to all four sets of questions to 
develop a comprehensive "regime theory" that meets the underlying concerns of regime analysis. 
In this essay, we summarize and draw together international research on regimes and institutions 
against the background of what an ideal "regime theory" would be able to tell us. This procedure 
serves two ends. It provides a state-of-the-art report that evaluates research on regimes over the 
last decade and identifies blank spots in existing knowledge. Our contribution also constitutes a 
basis for building a "database of international regimes," an endeavor in which we are currently 
involved. Although answering different questions associated with regime analysis may require 
different research strategies, it is helpful to have an inventory encompassing the information 
gathered in research on regimes along all dimensions. The development of an appropriate format 
for such an inventory requires a profound knowledge of all relevant work as well as a good sense 
of future directions in regime analysis. Since three individuals can at best approximate these 
requirements, we invite readers of this essay to provide input regarding the format and content of 
the regimes database. 
Before addressing the major research questions that drive regime analysis, it is 
important to focus on defining international regimes and distinguishing among different types of 
regimes. These matters are not important as ends in themselves. But they are instrumental in 
answering all the questions raised in regime analysis. 
2. DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
In a recent volume of the International Social Science Journal, three European 
scholars evaluate the contributions of regime analysis to our understanding of international 
organization. All three are highly critical of what they call "regime theory." One of their major 
criticisms concerns the definition of regimes: "[iln fact, the regime concept, as used by adepts of 
this approach, has never been clearly defined .... Definitions of the concept cover a mixed bag of 
subjects reflecting different meanings" (de Senarclens 1993, 456). In a generally balanced 
rejoinder, Helen Milner concedes that "[dlefining a regime remains a difficult task; one could 
say that despite the consensus definition proposed by Krasner a decade ago, the concept is still 
essentially contested" (Milner 1993,493-4). Given this background, it is important to tackle the 
definitional issue directly. In this section, we also offer some thoughts on distinctions among 
different types of international institutions that are likely to prove theoretically useful. 
2.1 What Are International Regimes? 
Critics have attacked the often-cited consensus definition (Krasner 1983, 2)2 for two 
major reasons. One criticism points to the difficulty in differentiating the four components of 
regimes (indistinguishable components); the other characterizes the standard definition as vague 
because it does not resolve differences among those who study international regimes regarding 
the boundaries of the universe of cases (vagueness). In addressing these criticisms, we do not 
seek to offer another alternative. Rather, we endeavor to modify and concretize the consensus 
definition in a way that accommodates different understandings but also allows analysts to 
distinguish among them. The goal is to be inclusive enough to permit comparisons among sets of 
regimes defined in somewhat different ways but, at the same time, precise enough to make these 
comparisons meaningful. 
Vagueness. There is broad agreement about at least two elements of the consensus 
definition. First, it treats regimes as social institutions in the sense of stable sets of rules, roles, 
and relationships.3 Second, it characterizes regimes as issue-area specific in contrast to the 
broader or deeper institutional structure of international society as a whole. Examples of deep 
structure include the ideas of pacta sunt servanda and diffuse reciprocity. Although it may be 
true that much of regime theory misses "the crucial link between the costs and benefits of 
specific legal rules and the role of international law as constitutive of the structure of the state 
system itself" (Hurrell 1993, 59), many studies of regimes have pointed to this institutional 
embeddedness as a topic requiring more attention (Ruggie 1983, Young 1989,13). 
Given this substantial consensus in conceptual terms, we turn to controversies about 
the adequacy of efforts to operationalize the concept of international regimes. Much of the 
criticism of definitional fuzziness points to the problem of knowing regimes when we see them 
2 "International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area" (Krasner 1983,2). 
3 This definition meshes well with influential formulations by Keohane (1989,3) who sees institutions as 
"persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, 
and shape expectations" and by Young (1989,5) who defines institutions as "identifiable practices of recognized 
roles linked by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles." 
rather than knowing what we are talking about in discussions of international regimes. Whereas 
an informal understanding of what makes up an international regime is often sufficient to 
formulate sensible research designs for "in-house" projects, the cumulation of knowledge based 
on comparisons of the findings of different projects requires a more formal operationalization. 
Since rules are more well-defined and concrete than principles and norms, they 
constitute the right starting point for operationalizing international regimes. The term "rules" is 
ambiguous because it is used both in the sense of "as a rule" (regularity) and in the sense of 
"follow the rule" (prescription). Given the basic thrust of regime analysis as a tool for 
understanding international cooperation and the role of norms in the pursuit of cooperation, there 
is a need to go beyond merely routinized or patterned behavior.4 The principal claim of regime 
analysis is that states may generate institutions in identifiable issue areas that affect their 
behavior and foster cooperation, even if short-term interests would dictate deviation. Patterned 
behavior, by contrast, may also emerge in the absence of institutions, and it does not presuppose 
cooperation. 
Two procedures for operationalizing the consensus definition have received 
attention. According to the first, we should look for explicit rules or injunctions (with an 
embodiment independent of the actors). The second suggests adding an element of observable 
behavior to the definition (Haggard and Simmons 1987, 494, Wolf and Ziirn 1986, 205). Both 
operationalizations have serious drawbacks when taken to extremes. The substantive procedure 
is in danger of circular reasoning - identifying regimes on the basis of observed behavior and 
then using regimes to explain this behavior. In addition, this approach requires difficult causal 
inferences about regimes in order to identify them. On the other hand, a purely formal 
operationalization includes numerous "paper regimes" or, more generally, an inflated universe of 
cases. 
A closer inspection reveals that these are not the only options. The debate actually 
involves two separable dimensions. With respect to each of these dimensions, the literature 
includes different notions of what is needed before we can speak about the existence of an 
international regime. The first dimension highlights the degree of formality of the rules, whereas 
the second features the degree to which the expectations of actors converge. Taken together, we 
can use these dimensions to construct a matrix that displays different notions of international 
regimes. 
Figure 1: Regime Definitions 
We do not think it makes sense to use the term "regime" in the absence of both a 
Convergence of 
Expectations 
Formalitv 
Low 
High 
4 "Patterned behavior" as an operational measure of regimes was suggested by Puchala and Hopkins (1983, 
63). 
Low 
no re~imes  
dead letter regimes 
High 
tacit regimes 
classic regimes 
minimum degree of formalization and a minimum degree of convergence in expectations. The 
northwest cell of Figure 1 is therefore empty. "Dead letter regimes" feature the existence of 
explicit rules including both substantive and procedural prescriptions articulated in written form, 
whether or not they are legally binding. Although the numerous truce agreements in Bosnia are 
cases featuring explicit rules that cast doubt on the value of this operationalization, the fact that 
it is easy to identify explicit rules makes this criterion attractive (Keohane 1993, 26-29). The 
term "tacit regimes," by contrast, refers to those cases in which regular but implicit references to 
informal rules are common along with behavior that is consistent with some independently 
inferred rules. The balance of power system in nineteenth-century Europe and the system of 
spheres of influence among the superpowers after World War I1 are examples of this type of 
regime. "Classic regimes" exist in those issue areas in which in addition to explicit rules and 
regular references to them, rule-consistent behavior is widespread. Rule-consistent behavior can 
be inferred when (a) clear violations remain the exception, (b) parties harmed by violations 
protest against them by implicitly or explicitly referring to the agreed upon rules, and (c) 
violators do not deny the rules and norms referred to in these prote~ts.~ We use the term "classic 
regime" for such cases since the presence of all indictors - explicit rules, regular references to the 
rules, rule-consistent behavior - ensures that virtually every regime analyst would agree that 
international regimes exist under these conditions; the study of these cases undoubtedly 
constitutes the core of regime analysis. The GAIT regime and the ozone regime are well-known 
cases in point. 
We do not think that it is sensible to push for exclusive reliance on one of these three 
approaches to operationalization. Each approach has significant virtues. We therefore propose to 
consider all three notions of regimes in our survey of the field. Using a procedure involving 
several explicitly specified entry criteria will allow scholars to construct arguments about both 
the formation and the impact of international regimes employing different universes of cases. So 
long as individual analysts are careful to state clearly the universe they are referring to, this 
procedure should facilitate the growth of knowledge rather than becoming a source of 
conf~sion.~ 
Indistinguishable Components. The second criticism asserts that distinctions 
among principles, norms, and rules lack intersubjective meaning. This leads to the suggestion 
that the distinction be dropped in favor of focusing exclusively on explicit injunctions. There is 
something to be said for this argument. Yet drawing such distinctions may still be heuristically 
useful, if we are able to provide some guidelines for discrimination. Principles involve goal 
orientations and causal beliefs cast at the level of general policy arenas, like economics, security, 
or the environment. The economic regimes created by the Western states after 1945, for 
example, were based on the principle of "embedded liberalism" (Ruggie 1983). Norms describe 
general rights and obligations that operate mainly on the level of issue areas. But they are still so 
general that it is often impossible to determine whether or not specific actions violate them. It is 
hard to say, for example, whether states have really followed the norm of "conditional reduction 
5 The assessment of rule-consistent behavior does not require causal statements, as the assessment of rule- 
guided behavior would. 
6 This operational version of the consensus definition emerged as a result of lengthy discussions during a 
"Regimes Summit" held at Dartmouth College during November 1991. See Oran Young (1991b). This report 
includes a list of participants in the discussions. See also Keohane (1993,26-29), Rittberger (1993,8-ll), Ziirn 
(1992,140-146). 
of trade barriers." Rules are the most concrete of the components referred to in the consensus 
definition. They are often stated explicitly in the formal agreements on which regimes are 
commonly based, and they facilitate assessments of implementation and compliance. Rules may, 
for example, specify explicit targets and timetables for tariff reductions called for in a specific 
industrial sector (Keohane 1984, 58, Krasner 1983, 4-5). Of course, these are approximate 
distinctions. Yet the resultant imprecision is not critical for purposes of identifying regimes since 
differentiating among principles, norms, and rules does not figure in defining regimes in the first 
place. 
Since the cost of retaining these distinctions is low, we ask whether their use has 
potential benefits. We see two advantages. These distinctions contribute to the descriptive 
richness that is a major strength of regime analysis, acknowledged by the critics of this research 
program.' Also, and more importantly, distinguishing among principles, norms, and rules makes 
it possible to classify regimes in ways that may prove useful in explaining regime formation and 
regime consequences. 
To sum up, we suggest defining international regimes as social institutions 
consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the 
interactions of actors in specijic issue-areas. As such, regimes give rise to recognized social 
practices in international society. Defined in this way, regimes are distinct from international 
organizations which are material entities,* from the broader structure of international society 
which consists of encompassing principles of conduct valid across all issue areas, and from the 
world order which encompasses the sum of all the institutional arrangements operative at the 
international level. On this account, international regimes may or may not include conventions. 
In his well-known study, Lewis (1969) separates conventions from institutions on the basis of 
the constellation of interests in which they are embedded (see also Schotter 1981, Snidal 1985, 
Ullmann-Margalit 1977). But when regimes are defined and operationalized in terms of social 
rules, it is not feasible to use the social environment of the rules to separate conventions (which 
also contain rules) from regimes.9 In effect, various characteristics of the social environment - 
the basis of the distinction between conventions and other institutions - become criteria which 
we can use to subdivide the overall universe of international regimes into subsets. 
2.2 Classifications of Regimes 
The principal reason for classifying regimes is to facilitate the formulation of 
hypotheses about regime formation and regime consequences. Thus, it is easy to envision the 
development of generalizations applying to subsets of regimes but not to the entire universe of 
7 See Kreile (1989) refemng to Harald Miiller's (1989) excellent account of the "non-proliferation Regime" 
that would have been weaker analytically if the distinction between principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures had not been applied. 
8 In practice, international organizations and international regimes are often closely intermeshed. Specific 
international organizations regularly perform a number of functions for international regimes, including 
monitoring, information-gathering, and rule-revising. On the other hand, international organizations can operate as 
regime-making mechanisms (e.g. the CSCE in the development of many East-West regimes). 
9 Keohane's (1989,4) use of the term "convention" differs from ours. He refers to implicit rules and 
understandings (without telling us how to identify them). His notion of conventions is clearly different from that 
of Lewis who would describe dress codes as conventions, whether or not they are stated explicitly. 
international regimes. To strengthen the institutionalist point of view, moreover, we ought to be 
able to account for variations in the consequences of international regimes by referring to the 
character of these institutions (endogenous variables) instead of by referring only to the causal 
factors used to explain variation among regimes in the first place (exogenous variables). Among 
students of domestic politics, the most convincing demonstrations that different institutional 
arrangements matter involve showing how different types of political institutions lead to 
different outcomes. When Maurice Duverger developed the hypothesis that polities with 
majority voting lead to two party systems whereas proportional voting generates multi-party 
systems, for example, he correctly focused on institutional differences to explain divergent 
outcomes. Other conceivable explanations of the number of parties in a given political system, 
such as the number of social cleavages within a society, might affect both the voting system and 
the party system. But focusing on these cleavages does not help us to understand the 
consequences of the political institutions. If institutions matter - at a minimum by mediating 
between underlying structures and outcomes in an issue area - we should be able to understand 
outcomes in that area by highlighting these institutional arrangements. 
All discussions of regime classifications confront a common problem. Innumerable 
regime attributes or properties can be used for classificatory purposes, and we lack good a priori 
criteria regarding what sorts of classifications will prove useful in future research. So far, 
empirical research on international regimes has not made systematic and explanatory use of 
regime classifications. Therefore, we cannot report replicated findings about typical formation 
paths or consequences of specific types of regimes. We draw the following conclusion from this. 
Systematic and sustained efforts to classify regimes constitute a blank spot in our understanding 
of international regimes which deserves more research. Given this situation, it seems sensible to 
start by focusing on variations in "core properties" of regimes. These are attributes that are 
explicitly mentioned in defining regimes. In the following paragraphs, then, we first take up the 
four regime components (principles, norms, rules, programs, and procedures), and then move on 
to classifications pointing to variations in types of actors as well as to differences in the issue 
areas to which the rules apply. 
Principles and norms. Classifying international regimes on the basis of different 
types of principles and norms constitutes the most familiar approach to this issue. 
* Regimes may or may not involve functional differentiation. According to 
sociological theory, regimes featuring a principled (as opposed to a practical) differentiation of 
roles among the participants (e.g. flag vs. port vs. coastal states or upstream vs. downstream 
states) exhibit higher degrees of institutionalization. We therefore expect that functionally 
differentiated regimes will be more difficult to create; they come into existence only as part of 
larger institutional networks. Yet once established, we expect them to be more influential in 
terms of consequences and to display greater robustness. 
* A comparatively well-established idea classifies regimes in terms of the 
assignment of property rights or the mode of allocation determined by their principles. Thus, we 
can distinguish among regimes serving to promote internationalization (e.g. the international 
seabed regime), nationalization (e.g. exclusive economic zones), and free access and exchange 
(e.g. international waters). Perhaps the most prominent hypothesis associated with this 
classification is the theory of hegemonic stability, which is not only a theory of regime 
formation but also predicts the emergence of regimes facilitating free exchange and access under 
conditions of high concentration in overall structural power (Krasner 1976). Some also argue 
that this classification is especially relevant to the distributional effects of regimes. Liberal or 
market-oriented regimes, which feature free exchange and access, may cause asymmetric 
distributions of resources between states and within states. Yet market-oriented regimes are 
expected to be particularly efficient, so that they increase overall social welfare. State-oriented 
regimes, which feature national property rights, probably reduce inequalities in the distribution 
of resources between states, but they do not necessarily alter domestic inequalities. In contrast, 
regimes that assign property rights to international authorities may allow for a more equal 
distribution of resources between and within states, but they are also likely to foster serious 
inefficiencies, as in the case of the common agricultural policy of the European Union (Krasner 
1985,514, Wolf 1991, Ziirn 1987,4546). 
* John Ruggie has developed an interpretation of multilateralism that emphasizes the 
underlying principle of cooperation rather than the number of participants involved. 
Multilateralism, on this account, describes institutions that build on (a) anti-discrimination as a 
generalized principle of conduct, (b) the principle of indivisibility, and (c) the principle of 
diffuse reciprocity, where these elements are treated as an indivisible ensemble (Ruggie 1992, 
570-73, see also Caparaso 1992,599-632). Accordingly, multilateral institutions can only prevail 
when multilateralism reflects a dominant normative orientation in the domestic practices of a 
hegemon or, more generally, the leading members of a regime (Ruggie 1992,592). With regard 
to regime consequences, liberal social theory suggests that multilateral regimes will produce 
more benign effects than others. 
* It is possible also to classify regimes in terms of goal orientation. We may 
distinguish regimes that serve mainly to increase the utility of regime participants in absolute 
terms (internal regimes), for example, from those that seek to improve the position of members 
relative to outsiders (external regimes) (Ziirn 1987,40-45). To operationalize this distinction, we 
can look at membership rules. A related distinction separates open institutions (e.g. the United 
Nations), conditionally open institutions (e.g. IMF, GATT), and institutions with restricted 
membership (e.g. NATO, OPEC, EU), with the latter being most externally oriented (Keohane 
1993,39). 
Rules. Efforts to classify regimes in terms of different types of rules commonly 
draw on judicial and sociological theory: 
* In her well-known work entitled Governing the Commons, Elinor Ostrom argues 
that "[i.]nstitutional rules are prescriptive statements that forbid, require, or permit some action or 
outcome. One of the three deontic operators - forbid, require, permit - must be contained in a 
statement for it to be considered as a rule" (Ostrom 1990, 139).1° We can therefore classify 
regimes on the basis of whether they highlight prohibitions, requirements, or permissions. 
Although we do not know of existing hypotheses, this distinction may shed light on regime 
formation and consequences in much the same way that Theodore Lowi's parallel distinction 
among regulative, distributive, and redistributive policies has contributed to understanding 
- - 
10 At another point, Ostrom also distinguishes between operational, collective-choice, and constitutional 
rules (ibid., 52). This distinction resembles the one between substantive and decision-making rules suggested in 
the regime definition. 
different policymaking processes in domestic political systems (Lowi 1964). We may expect 
also that requiring rules will be the most hotly contested, whereas permitting rules are much 
easier to implement, and prohibitions lie in between. 
* Thomas Franck has argued that international rules exert a normative pull toward 
compliance to the extent that they are legitimate. Consequently, he asks what observable 
characteristics of rules increase or decrease their legitimacy and therefore their pull toward 
compliance. Four characteristics of rules appear to enhance legitimacy: (a) determinateness and 
clarity, (b) symbolic validation within the participating community, (c) internal coherence, and 
(d) vertical links between a primary rule of obligation, which is the system's workhorse, and a 
hierarchy of secondary rules, which identify the sources of rules and establish "normative 
standards that define how rules are to be made, interpreted, and applied" (Franck 1990, 184). 
Regime analysis should seek to test this complex hypothesis carefully, not least for the 
contributions this effort can make to the debate between rationalists and reflectivists. 
* A regime may be described as strong when its rules are dense, specific, and cover a 
broad range of activities (Keohane 1993, 41-3). Clearly, weak regimes will be limited in terms 
of problem-solving capacity. Nonetheless, a strong regime may encounter compliance problems, 
at least in the short run, since the number of inconvenient commitments increases with the 
number and breadth of rules. If a regime exhibiting high rule-density survives its first challenges 
(e.g. a change of governments, deterioration in overall relationships among members), however, 
it can be expected to be resilient in subsequent periods, since the rules have a stabilizing effect 
upon each other 
Procedures and Programs. Typologies of regimes featuring distinctions among 
decision-making procedures are numerous. Work on international organizations that highlights 
the effects of different voting systems (Freeman and Cannizo 1981, Lister 1984) or the 
secretariat's role in decision-making (Cox and Jacobson 1973) is relevant here. Yet three other 
characteristics of decision-making procedures seem to us especially important. 
* If a regime that is initially weak (as defined above) is accompanied by a decision- 
making procedure that is autonomous in the sense of being able to revise rules, the regime is apt 
to foster learning at the international level and to lead to the establishment of new rules. 
Institutions have strong decision-making procedures if changes are carried out according to an ex 
ante plan or, in other words, a procedure spelled out in the regime itself (Kenneth Shepsle as 
quoted in Ostrom 1990, 58). We may call such arrangements evolutionary regimes. Regimes of 
this type may turn out to be successful as problem solvers in the long run by giving a strong 
impetus to learning. Many environmental protection arrangements are good examples of this 
regime type (Haas, Keohane, and Levy, eds., 1993, Breitmeier et al. 1993). In contrast, reliant or 
static regimes, where decision-making procedures are not sufficiently developed to react to 
external changes, can turn out to be brittle in the face of external changes. They can be expected 
as well to have a low impact with regard to the learning. Still, regimes of this kind may prove 
effective in managing prolonged conflicts of a static nature. A case in point is the Berlin regime 
(Schwarzer 1990). 
* We can speculate as well about the character of collective-choice mechanisms in 
autonomous regimes. A rough distinction separates institutions in which most members affected 
by the rules participate in modifying them (e.g. the SALT-based regime) and those in which a 
few privileged members have the authority to modify the rules (e.g. the IMF-based regime). We 
would expect the distribution of benefits flowing from cooperation to vary in terms of this 
difference. 
* Regimes also differ with regard to their compliance mechanisms, including 
monitoring, sanctioning, and dispute-resolution procedures. Where compliance mechanisms are 
highly developed, we would expect that the regime was established to solve what game theory 
characterizes as a dilemma. Regimes with strong compliance mechanisms can be expected to 
alter the behavior of regime participants considerably. On the other hand, weak monitoring, 
sanctioning, and dispute-resolution procedures should characterize regimes emerging in 
situations resembling games (Martin 1992, Stein 1983); they will alter behavior only 
moderately. Despite the emphasis rational choice theorists place on them (Coleman 1990, Chaps. 
10-11, Ostrom 1990), the analysis of compliance mechanisms remains an underdeveloped 
dimension of regime analysis. 
Actors and issue areas. International regimes govern the interactions of actors in 
specific issue areas. It follows that regimes may vary with respect to the number and type of 
actors involved as well as the type and scope of issues covered or, in other words, the problem 
structure. The number of actors participating in an international regime may vary from two to 
the complete set of states. Whereas it is more difficult to create regimes with many actors, we do 
not know much about the effects of numbers on regime consequences. Still, it is more or less 
accepted that the participation of non-state actors (e.g. Greenpeace or Amnesty International) 
and epistemic communities, at least in the rule-implementation stage, does improve the 
effectiveness of environmental regimes. We can expect as well that learning will be positively 
affected by agreements that include non-state actors (Haas, ed., 1992, Haas, Keohane, and Levy, 
eds., 1993). 
Little effort has been made so far to use distinctions involving problem structure to 
account for differences in regime consequences, though they have proved useful in accounting 
for differences in the likelihood of regime formation. Some analysts argue, however, that when 
the principles and norms of a regime are nested together with other regimes, the regime becomes 
highly resilient in the face of deterioration in the overall relationships to which it relates 
(Keohane 1984, Miiller 1993). Furthermore, where networks of regimes link the same set of 
participants, actors' perceptions of each other's behavior are more likely to be affected than 
where regimes are isolated. 
Taxonomic Factors 
Degree of convergence of expectations 
Degree of formalism 
Princi~les and Norms 
Degree of functional differentiation of roles 
Mode of assigning of property rights 
Adherence to norms of multilateralism 
Internal-external orientation 
Forbidding-requiring-permitting 
Legitimacy 
Strength 
Procedures and Programs 
Capacity to revise rules 
Concentration of decision-making power 
Compliance mechanisms 
Involvement of non-state actors 
Issue area 
Number of relevant actors 
Nesting with other regimes 
Problem structure 
Table 1: Factors Used To Classify Regimes 
This quick survey points to a number of ways to classify regimes that may be useful 
in efforts to understand their formation and their consequences. Yet most of these distinctions 
remain unexplored empirically. The development and use of regime typologies require a 
research design emphasizing comparisons among cases, a point of considerable importance 
given that much research on international regimes to date has taken the form of single case 
studies or structured, focused comparisons using a small number of cases. Only by studying a 
larger number of cases comparatively can we develop regime typologies that contribute 
significantly to our understanding of the role of international regimes in world politics. 
3. REGIME FORMATION 
Regime formation, a subject that encompasses the reformation of existing 
institutional arrangements as well as the creation of new institutions where none have previously 
existed, has emerged as one of the central concerns of the "new institutionalism" in international 
relations (Keck 1991, Moravcsik 1992, Zacher and Matthew 1992, Young 1994). The study of 
regime formation can be broken down into three distinct - albeit interrelated - topics (Young and 
Osherenko, eds., 1993). There is, first, the basic question of whether those parties interested in a 
given issue succeed in forming a regime or fail to reach closure on the terms of a mutually 
agreeable institutional arrangement. In cases where regime formation is ultimately successful, it 
is pertinent to proceed to a second topic by asking how long it takes to move from the 
appearance of an issue on the active international agenda to the conclusion of an agreement 
setting forth the terms of a regime. As the cases of East-West relations in Europe (Rittberger and 
Ziirn 1990), Antarctica, and the northern fur seal attest (Beck 1986, Mirovitskaya, Clark, and 
Purver 1993), it is not uncommon for two decades or more to elapse in the effort to reach 
agreement on the terms of an international regime, a matter of growing concern to those who 
believe we have entered an era of rapidly escalating environmental and other crises. Third, we 
want to ask about the substantive content or character of the regimes created to deal with 
international issues. This is a matter of particular concern to those who emphasize the 
importance of tailoring the features of specific institutional arrangements to the nature of the 
problems they are created to solve. A comprehensive theory of regime formation, should allow 
us to account for success or failure in efforts to establish regimes, the time it takes to reach 
agreement in successful cases, and the substantive provisions set forth in constitutional contracts 
devised for individual regimes. 
The major analytic issues raised in the study of regime formation can be grouped 
into six broad categories: behavior of the actors in regime formation, processes of regime 
formation, stages of regime formation, driving social forces, crosscutting factors, and 
multivariate models. 
3.1 Actors and Actor Behavior 
Most students of international regimes accept the view that the members of these 
arrangements are states. But this does not mean that non-state actors and even individuals are 
irrelevant to processes of regime formation; far from it. Increasingly, non-state actors loom large 
in framing issues for inclusion on the international agenda and in focusing attention on specific 
issues in a way that induces states to work toward the creation of institutional arrangements 
dealing with them. Today, representatives of non-state actors frequently serve as members of 
national delegations working on the provisions of international regimes. Often they are also 
accepted as observers in their own right. All this has important consequences for the nature of 
the political dynamics involved in both the initial creation and the reformation of international 
institutions. But it does not alter the fact that regimes are properly understood as social practices 
created to guide interactions among the members of international society (that is, states) in 
identifiable issue areas. 
Early studies of regime formation treated participating states as unitary actors 
seeking to maximize some sort of national interest. But this practice has given way to a number 
of newly emerging lines of analysis emphasizing the fact that the participants in regime 
formation are complex collective entities. Perhaps the most influential of these is the study of 
two-level games, a perspective that emphasizes the linkages between bargaining among states 
and bargaining within individual states over positions to be taken at the international level 
(Putnam 1988, Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, eds., 1993). But several other lines of analysis are 
noteworthy in this connection as well. Some writers have examined the cultural and institutional 
roots of behavioral differences among states participating in processes of regime formation 
(Vernon 1993). Others have focused on the role of scientists in developing the positions of states 
on a range of issues including the loss of stratospheric ozone, threats to biological diversity, and 
climate change (Susskind 1994). Still others have proposed the idea of regime-conducive foreign 
policies and endeavored to identify links between various features of domestic politics and the 
articulation of foreign policies of this type (Ziirn 1993). 
3.2 Processes of Regime Formation 
Three distinct visions of the process of regime formation have emerged in the 
literature on international regimes: self-generation, negotiation, and imposition (Young 1983). 
All regimes are expected to feature explicit - though not necessarily formal - rules in the end," 
but the processes involved in reaching this point can vary greatly. Thus, a self-generating or 
spontaneous regime is one that emerges through some process of converging expectations that 
does not require conscious efforts on the part of those who become participants in the resultant 
social practice. Much favored by political conservatives because it obviates the need for 
institutional design or social engineering, this process is often described as a means of producing 
order without law (Ellickson 1991). A negotiated regime is one that arises from a conscious 
process of bargaining in which the parties engage in extended efforts to hammer out mutually 
agreeable provisions to incorporate into an explicit agreement. Thought by many, including most 
practitioners, to be the primary process of regime formation in international society, negotiation 
has become a familiar feature of the landscape of international institutional affairs. An imposed 
regime, by contrast, is an arrangement that is favored by a single powerful actor (or, in some 
cases, a small coalition of powerful actors) which succeeds in inducing others to accede to its 
institutional preferences. Favored by those who think in terms of structural power and look for 
ruling elites as the prime movers in the creation of institutions, imposition can also be 
interpreted more benignly as a process through which leading actors supply institutional 
arrangements looked upon as public goods to privileged groups (Olson 1965, Snidal1985). 
The study of actual cases of regime formation suggests that these distinctions are 
best thought of as analytic rather than concrete in character. What this means is that specific 
instances of regime formation are apt to exhibit elements of all three processes, though one or 
another may be particularly prominent in individual cases. As those who have analyzed tacit 
bargaining have made clear, for example, successful negotiations regularly involve some 
convergence of expectations that cannot be explained through a study of the explicit bargaining 
process (Schelling 1960, Axelrod 1984, Downs and Rocke 1990). Similarly, studies of 
bargaining strength have produced a rich set of observations about factors governing success or 
failure on the part of powerful actors seeking to bring their structural resources to bear on the 
process of regime formation (Young 1994). The fact that the terms of international regimes are 
generally articulated in formal agreements, therefore, should not lead us to overlook self- 
generation and imposition as important aspects of the process of regime formation. The 
challenge before us at this point is to improve our grasp of the interactions among these 
processes as they play out in specific cases. 
11 A separate distinction deals with the degree to which regime members are conscious of the contents of a 
regime's rules and able to articulate them clearly. Informal rules may be explicit in the sense that analysts have no 
trouble identifying them clearly, even though regime members may have difficulty articulating them. 
3.3 Stages of Regime Formation 
Recent work has made it clear that it is useful to divide the process of regime 
formation into at least three stages: agenda formation, institutional choice, and 
operationalization. The stage of agenda formation encompasses the emergence of an issue on the 
political agenda, the framing of the issue for consideration in international forums, and the rise 
of the issue to a high enough place on the international agenda to warrant priority treatment 
(Stein, ed., 1989). Institutional choice takes an issue from the point where it becomes a priority 
item on the international agenda to the point of agreement on the provisions of a specific regime. 
Operationalization covers all those activities required to transform an agreement on paper into a 
functioning social practice (Jacobson and Weiss 1990). In international society, the 
operationalization stage often involves efforts on the part of member states to bring a regime's 
rules to bear on various non-state actors (e.g. fishers, oil tanker ownerdoperators, power plant 
managers) operating under their jurisdiction; it may also stimulate efforts on the part of those 
expecting their interests to be adversely affected by the operation of the regime to redefine some 
of its provisions. In some cases (e.g., the whaling regime or the vessel-source oil pollution 
regime), operationalization involves setting up international organizations to take charge of 
implementation review procedures, to make periodic decisions about the operation of the regime, 
to handle financial matters, and to deal with various administrative issues. 
It appears, at this point, that the relevance of the different processes of regime 
formation varies from one of these stages to another. Again and again, issues requiring the 
creation of international regimes are defined and developed conceptually in the absence of any 
explicit process. As the recent shift from single-species perspectives to whole ecosystems 
thinking suggests, this phase of the process is apt to reflect broader developments in the 
intellectual capital available to deal with such concerns. Similarly, there are severe constraints on 
the usefulness of imposition as a means of compelling individual states to act vigorously during 
the operationalization stage of regime formation. As recent experiences with issues like 
transboundary air pollution and deforestation make clear, in fact, powerful states sometimes find 
that they can make more progress through measures to build capacity and otherwise assist 
weaker states in their efforts to implement the terms of international regimes than they can 
through threats or sanctions intended to force weaker states to comply with the terms of 
international regimes. 
3.4 Driving Social Forces 
Much of the energy of those interested in regime formation has gone into efforts to 
identify specific factors that play a causal role in the process of institutional development and to 
assess the relative importance of these factors in actual cases (Haggard and Simmons 1987). 
Three clusters of factors have emerged as the primary claimants for the attention of those 
concerned with regime formation: power, knowledge, and interests. Realists and many neo- 
realists view agreements setting forth the terms of international regimes as reflections of the 
distribution of power in the material sense (Strange 1983). Regimes can therefore be expected to 
change from time to time in the wake of shifts in the distribution of structural power in 
international society. Those who stress the role of ideas often treat knowledge as a form of 
power that is distinct from structural power. They emphasize the role of consensual knowledge 
and social learning in the processes giving rise to international regimes (E. Haas 1990). In 
extreme cases, institutional arrangements may be expressions of hegemony in the Gramscian or 
ideational sense (Cox 1983). Analysts stressing the role of interests look to interactive decision- 
making and the search for solutions to collective-action problems as the motivating force 
underlying regime formation (Young 1989, Ziirn 1992). They conceptualize regime formation as 
a mixedlmotive process in which individual parties seek to arrive at mutually agreeable deals. 
Empirical work on regime formation has produced a number of notable conclusions 
about the role of these clusters of factors. Recent studies have provided little support for the 
theory of hegemonic stability which stresses the role of dominant states in the process of regime 
formation and which has loomed for some time as a central concern of those who focus on 
power factors (Keohane 1984, Rittberger 1990, ed., Young and Osherenko, eds., 1993). Yet this 
does not mean that the role of power more generally is unimportant in the process of regime 
formation. It is worth considering a variety of other power-based arguments, such as the idea 
that some rough parity among the participants is important, in moving beyond the increasingly 
sterile debate about hegemony. Research on the role of ideas has focused recently on arguments 
pertaining to social learning and to the role of epistemic communities, construed as transnational 
groups of scientists and policymakers who become carriers and transmitters of ways of thinking 
about international problems and their solutions (Haas, ed., 1992). Studies of actual cases have 
made it clear that these arguments will require considerably more development in analytic terms 
before they can be properly tested as contributions to our understanding of regime formation. 
One line of work on interest-based arguments is now centered on the idea of institutional 
bargaining, a form of bargaining featuring efforts to arrive at consensus on the terms of 
institutional arrangements under conditions of imperfect information about the payoff possibility 
set (Young 1989). These studies stress the importance of integrative as well as distributive 
bargaining and suggest that the image of "life on the Pareto frontier" (Krasner 1991) is a 
misleading one, at least when it comes to regime formation. Stressing the creative role of 
institutional bargaining, this way of thinking raises questions about the arguments many 
observers have made concerning the significance of problem structure as determinants of regime 
formation (Rittberger, ed., 1990). 
3.5 Crosscutting Factors 
Efforts to sort out the relative importance of power, knowledge, and interests 
through an examination of actual cases have revealed the significance of two additional factors 
that cut across the three original clusters: individual leadership and context. Careful 
reconstructions of the creation stories of specific regimes regularly point to the roles prominent 
individuals play at critical junctures in the formation processes (Young and Osherenko, eds., 
1993). In this connection, it is helpful to distinguish three types of leadership that parallel the 
driving social forces described in the preceding paragraphs (Young 1991a). Structural leaders 
are individuals who represent states and devise stratagems for bringing power in the material or 
structural sense to bear on processes of regime formation. Intellectual leaders, by contrast, 
develop and exploit ideas to shape the way issues are framed and to energize the occurrence of 
social learning during formation processes. For their part, entrepreneurial leaders endeavor to 
highlight the integrative aspect of institutional bargaining, to craft new options capable of 
producing consensus, and to broker deals that lead to closure on the terms of constitutional 
contracts. Different types of leadership are apt to loom large in one or another of the stages of 
regime formation. Whereas intellectual leadership is particularly prominent at the agenda 
formation stage, entrepreneurial leadership is more important at the stage of institutional choice. 
But in virtually every case of successful regime formation, one or more key individuals have 
provided leadership at crucial turning points. 
The process of creating international regimes does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, 
this process unfolds in a setting in which any number of other issues can intrude to promote or 
impede the creation process. The outbreak of World War I in 1914, for example, terminated 
efforts to craft an international regime for the Svalbard Archipelago for a period of six years and 
ushered in a political setting in which the regime fmally created in 1920 was radically different 
from the proposals on the table in 1914 (Singh and Saguirian 1993). The initiation of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process in the 1970s and the desire 
on the part of the Soviet Union to convey a spirit of cooperation in this connection, by contrast, 
provided the impetus to reach agreement on the terms of a number of institutional arrangements. 
These include the Geneva Convention of 1979 setting forth initial provisions of a regime for 
long-range transboundary air pollution (Soroos 1993). an arrangement which has subsequently 
evolved into a complex institution with considerable impact on the behavior of some of its 
members (Levy 1993a). Because they are not connected with processes of regime formation in 
any substantive sense, the role these contextual or idiosyncratic factors play in specific cases is 
difficult to anticipate. Yet they can have drastic effects on regime creation, a fact that means we 
must be on the lookout for them at all times. 
3.6 Multivariate Models 
The challenge before us now is to move beyond efforts to single out individual 
factors as the key to regime formation in international society (Young and Osherenko, eds., 
1993, Efinger, Mayer, and Schwarzer 1993). In part, this endeavor must involve a recognition of 
the role of equifmality in the formation of international regimes or, in other words, the existence 
of multiple tracks along which such processes can move toward the same end (or equivalent 
ends). It is no doubt true that there are cases in which a dominant state or a hegemon supplies 
institutional arrangements to the members of a privileged group as a kind of public good. But 
there are many cases in which regime formation takes the form of a bargaining process among 
actors or coalitions that are more nearly equals. Similarly, while integrative bargaining and 
social learning loom large in some cases, other cases appear to be better understood in terms of 
the striking of deals among actors possessing a clear sense of the contours of the payoff space or 
the negotiation set associated with the institutional options available to them. The importance of 
equifmality indicates that we should not be overly concerned with the search for necessary 
conditions for success in the process of regime formation, a search that is likely to prove 
frustrating and relatively fruitless. Yet there is nothing in this realization to prevent us from 
identifying a number of tracks that successful processes of regime formation can follow - such as 
provision on the part of a single dominant actor or action on the part of a k group or small 
number of leading actors (Schelling 1978) - and from spelling out the sorts of cases that are 
likely to proceed along each of these tracks. 
Equally important is the need to acknowledge that the distinctions laid out in the 
preceding sections are analytic in character and that interaction effects between and among them 
are the rule rather than the exception. Institutional bargaining, for example, often leads to a 
recasting of the nature of the problem under consideration; efforts to operationalize the terms of 
constitutional contracts frequently trigger a reconsideration of provisions accepted at an earlier 
stage or a move to augment or extend the provisions set forth in an initial agreement. Knowledge 
can produce new technologies that alter the relative bargaining power of those engaged in 
processes of regime formation. Yet power in the material sense sometimes allows its possessors 
to maintain and even increase their access to superior knowledge. These subtleties should not be 
allowed to derail efforts to construct generalizations that can help us to identify patterns in 
complex processes of regime formation. But they do emphasize the value of careful efforts to 
reconstruct the creation stories of individual regimes through procedures like process tracing and 
thick description. The challenge before us in improving our understanding of regime formation, 
then, is to delve into the subtleties of these interaction effects as they unfold in individual cases, 
without losing track of the importance of identifying patterns that can sustain useful 
generalizations about the creation of international regimes. 
4. DO REGIMES MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
Early regime analysis focused on identifying the conditions under which 
international regimes form. Not surprisingly, skeptics branded this an irrelevant exercise, since it 
failed to address the question of whether regimes matter, in other words, whether they are more 
than epiphenomenal in relation to underlying social forces. The neo-realists, in particular, regard 
institutionalized cooperation as a reflection of the distribution of structural power, implying that 
specific regimes will be abandoned when the underlying power distribution changes or when 
institutional commitments become inconvenient to one or more powerful member states. On this 
account, it is wasteful at best to devote resources to the analysis of institutionalized cooperation 
in world politics. At worst, it may prove seriously misleading. 
There are two ways to meet this challenge and, in the process, demonstrate that 
regimes do make a difference. We can show that once established, regimes display a persistence 
or robustness that cannot be explained fully in terms of the conditions under which they formed 
in the first place. In a sense, this is a negative proof of the importance of international 
institutions. The positive proof goes one step further and aims at pinpointing specific ways in 
which regimes make a difference. Although this second strategy is methodologically more 
complicated, it is of great practical relevance and has become the focus of much of the current 
research on international regimes (see Section 5 below). In this section, we report briefly on the 
research that established the idea that regimes are more than mere epiphenomena. 
4.1 Changes in Power Distribution 
Many observers have cited the formation of the GATT regime to regulate 
international trade as a clear illustration of the dynamic emphasized by the theory of hegemonic 
stability. The United States, which was clearly the dominant state in economic terms during the 
1940s, took the lead in building this fundamental element of the postwar world order. Since the 
1970s, however, America's economic dominance has declined, and the Japanese and European 
economies have caught up. Yet the global economic crises of the late 1970s and the early 1990s 
did not destroy the GAIT regime. There have been modifications and adaptations of the GAIT 
rules as well as some discordant actions. But these economic crises have not triggered 
competitive devaluations or wholesale protectionism. Robert Keohane has used this finding of 
"cooperation after hegemony" to probe the functions of existing regimes. These functions entail, 
above all, reductions in uncertainty and insecurity. Thus, regimes (a) stabilize mutual 
expectations regarding future behavior, (b) reduce transaction costs, (c) produce information 
otherwise not available or available only at high cost, and (d) provide a frame of reference that 
ensures that the interaction repeats itself frequently enough to generate a long "shadow of the 
future" (Keohane 1984, Chap. 7). Given stable constellations of interests and distributions of 
capacity, international regimes improve the contractual environment and thus stabilize 
cooperation, even if the conditions under which the regime came into existence no longer hold. 
Whereas regime building may be difficult, the maintenance of regimes may prove easier. Thus, 
"the high costs of regime building help existing regimes to persist" (Lym-Jones 1988,498-499). 
4.2 Changes in Overall Relations 
If international regimes for specific issue areas perform their prescribed functions, 
they are likely to persist even when confronted with a deterioration of overall relations among 
the participants. Since deteriorating overall relations raise uncertainty about the motivations and 
future behavior of other actors, cooperation in issue areas not governed by the presence of 
regimes is likely to vanish as a consequence of such changes. In issue areas featuring stable 
regimes, however, meeting such challenges should pose fewer problems. This hypothesis is 
clearly corroborated by evidence from the study of East-West regimes (Rittberger and Ziirn 
1990). Regimes established before the deterioration of overall East-West relations between 1979 
and 1984 proved robust. The Baltic environmental protection regime, for example, was not 
affected at all by the worsening of East-West relations; none of the meetings of the consultative 
committees was canceled and the general problem-solving approach espoused by the participants 
remained unchanged. Similarly, the rules for managing conflicts in the issue area of Berlin, 
which had been highly contested for almost thirty years, remained fully operational. The inter- 
German trade regime also displayed resilience in the face of deteriorating overall relations. 
Pertinent analyses of other issue areas in East-West relations involving modes of conflict 
management approximating what we call regimes yield similar results. Neither the nuclear non- 
proliferation regime nor the incidents-at-sea regime was seriously affected by the deterioration 
of East-West relations beginning in the late seventies. This robustness of East-West regimes 
seems even more remarkable when we compare issue areas in which conflict management did 
not cross the threshold of regime formation. In the cases of working conditions of foreign 
journalists and confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, the period between 1979 
and 1984 had unambiguously negative impacts. 
4.3 Inconvenient Commitments 
Some analysts have suggested that regime persistence is best demonstrated through 
close observation of their influence on the decisions of individual governments, especially in 
cases where compliance with regime rules seems inconvenient. Pursuing this idea, Harald Miiller 
(1993) studied the role of the anti-ballistic missile treaty, construed as a component of the 
strategic nuclear weapons control regime, in American decision-making regarding strategic 
defense and Soviet decision-making regarding the illegal construction of an early warning radar 
system at Krasnoyarsk. In both cases, influential civilian or military agencies sought to 
implement policies that violated the provisions of the regime. In each case, the regime proved to 
be a critical resource for those opposed to these policies. Concern that non-compliance would 
endanger the regime mobilized the resistance of those who believed the maintenance of the 
regime to be in the national interest. In addition, Miiller shows that the regime itself - through its 
connection with international and domestic laws as well as through the foreseeable effects of 
defection on a state's international reputation - served as an important barrier to non-compliance. 
4.4 Unsatisfying Outcomes 
Another type of challenge to the persistence of international regimes arises in cases 
of apparent failure to solve problems. Studies of the ozone regime, the Mediterranean Action 
Plan, and the Baltic Sea regime have shown that the initial institutional response to the problem 
at hand was grossly inadequate. But in each case, the creation of the regime initiated an 
institutional dynamic leading to a progressive adaptation of regime rules based on new 
knowledge about the nature of the problem. These "evolutionary" (List 1991) or "dynamic" 
(Gehring 1994) processes did not evaporate in the face of evidence of poor performance. Rather, 
the regimes became increasingly effective and robust through a process of internally generated 
reform. In his study of the Mediterranean Action Plan, for example, Peter Haas (1990) provides 
a detailed account of the ways in which activities initiated by regimes give rise to such 
evolutionary processes. 
Once established, then, international regimes often prove robust when confronted 
with challenges stemming from changes in the perceived benefits and costs of living up to 
commitments, the distribution of power among the participants, or the overall relationship of the 
parties. If a regime seems too weak as initially constituted to achieve its institutional goals, 
moreover, this may trigger a dynamic leading to a strengthening of the regime itself. This does 
not mean, of course, that international regimes are eternal. A fundamental transformation in the 
domestic political system of a major member state leading to far-reaching changes in that party's 
international interests, for example, can cause the failure of international institutions. Thus, Nazi 
Germany abandoned almost all the institutional commitments of the Weimar Republic in order 
to build new ones with the Axis powers and various states in Southeastern Europe. If some of 
the world's major economic powers were to embrace a strategy of economic autarky, this 
development would undoubtedly endanger today's GATT regime.12 Similarly, regimes may be 
unable to survive the disappearance of key members. None of the regimes regulating German- 
German relations, for example, remains in place today, and many regimes regulating East-West 
relations are in transition.13 We know far less about processes of regime decline or decay than 
12 Besides being robust with respect to a given constellation of interests, however, international regimes 
may foster learning processes that make the constellation of international interests more conducive to 
institutionalized cooperation. The GAlT regime may be construed as an example of this phenomenon. See Milner 
(1989). Rogowski (1989), and Section 6 of this essay. 
13 Yet even the process of transition shows signs of regime robustness. The degree to which new states, such 
as Russia and Ukraine, are willing to take on the institutional commitments of the former Soviet Union can hardly 
about the factors governing persistence of regimes in the face of changing circumstances. 
Studies of regime decay, moreover, should prove rewarding not only as ends in themselves but 
also as sources of insights regarding regime persistence. 
5. REGIME CONSEQUENCES - EFFECTIVENESS 
How exactly do international institutions operate to help society manage 
international problems? How much of the variance in problem solving at the international level 
can we reasonably attribute to the operation of institutional arrangements in contrast to other 
forces at work in international society? Although the last decade has witnessed a striking growth 
of interest in international regimes, we remain unable to frame convincing answers to these 
central questions. For the most part, the answers proposed by those possessing extensive 
knowledge of individual regimes have failed to generalize to other cases. At the same time, the 
efforts of those seeking to compare and contrast a variety of regimes in these terms have 
encountered a number of problems concerning the drawing of causal inferences. This section 
reviews the evidence accumulated so far concerning the consequences of regimes. We have 
organized this effort under the rubric of effectiveness, because this concept directs attention to 
the consequences of international institutions having the most direct connection to the outcomes 
deemed desirable by the actors who create them. Regimes can have consequences that do not fit 
under the heading of effectiveness; some of these are discussed in the following section. 
5.1 The Meaning of Effectiveness 
Broadly speaking, effectiveness has to do with the contributions institutions make to 
solving the problems that motivate actors to create them. On further examination, however, 
effectiveness emerges as an elusive concept construed quite differently by various analysts. The 
significance of these differences lies in the fact that each meaning requires analysts to make a 
different combination of difficult normative, scientific, and historical judgments. 
International regimes commonly emerge in response to particular problems - 
environmental deterioration, escalating tariffs, border conflicts. In the final analysis, therefore, 
effectiveness is a matter of the degree to which a regime ameliorates the problem that prompted 
its creation. Is environmental quality improving, are tariffs falling, are border clashes declining? 
Yet this definition presents practical difficulties that are sometimes severe. The social systems 
that are the focus of international regimes are typically complicated and subject to complex 
fluctuations. It is therefore difficult, under the best of circumstances, to ascribe observed changes 
to the operation of specific international rules. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that 
most problems serious enough to justify the creation of an international regime motivate actors 
to pursue solutions through a variety of means, including some that do not involve the regime 
directly. What looks like an effective regime, in terms of problem solving, therefore, may be 
only an irrelevant side show. Accordingly, the concept of problem solving, which is appealing in 
directing our attention to the substantive bottom line, can become the source of its own 
limitations because it is so hard to apply meaningfully. 
hardly be accounted for without refemng to factors l i e  regime robustness. See Schirnmelfennig (1994). 
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that students of regimes have turned to a 
variety of other approaches to elucidating the meaning of effectiveness. A legal definition of 
effectiveness holds that the measure of success is the degree to which conflicts become regulated 
by the rule of law (commonly reflected in contractual obligations), and to the extent to which 
contractual obligations are met - substantive provisions are implemented, rules are complied 
with, policies are adopted, and so on. In contrast to problem-solving, this view provides a more 
straightforwad approach to measurement. But this operational clarity comes at a price, both 
because this approach ignores non-contractual consequences of regimes and because 
implementation and compliance tell us little about problem solving. A more applied or policy- 
oriented definition, which appeals to many economists as well as practitioners, focuses on well- 
defined goals and asks what policy adjustments will prove effective in attaining these goals. This 
leads to interesting debates about such matters as the relative efficiency of command-and-control 
regulations and tradable permits as means of achieving targets specified by a regime. But it does 
not provide a basis for generalizing about the overall causal significance of institutions in 
addressing international problems. For its part, a political definition conceives of the problems 
regimes confront as a function of specific constellations of actors, interests, and interactive 
relationships; it directs attention to behavior and behavioral change. Effective regimes cause 
changes in the behavior of actors and in patterns of interactions among them in ways that 
contribute to management of targeted problems. The primary strength of this approach is its firm 
connection to the real world through its emphasis on observable behavior. Among its drawbacks, 
on the other hand, are a tendency to lose sight of the objectives regimes are established to 
achieve and to slight policy concerns. 
What are the implications of these definitional complications? If every scholar 
insisted on the prior development of a logically concise and easily operationalized definition of 
effectiveness, little research would get done. If we collectively insisted on the development of a 
common definition, there would be none at all. At this stage, there is room for a number of 
research strategies, some of which employ different definitions of effectiveness. What is 
essential in this connection is to state definitions explicitly, so that differences in both analytical 
and empirical findings can be debated meaningfully instead of getting confused with mere 
terminological differences. In the process, we should learn whether the use of different 
definitions of effectiveness leads to substantial divergences in judgments regarding the level of 
effectiveness achieved by individual regimes. In the review that follows, therefore, we seek to 
include relevant bodies of evidence, regardless of the particular definitions of effectiveness they 
employ. 
5.2 The Domain of Effectiveness 
We can differentiate regime consequences along at least three distinct dimensions: 
(1) direct versus indirect effects, (2) internal versus external effects, and (3) positive versus 
negative effects. 
In essence, the question of whether a regime's effects are direct or indirect is a matter 
of the length of the causal chain connecting the regime to the behavior in question. Direct effects 
are linked by short causal chains, indirect effects by longer ones. Generally speaking, it is easier 
to trace direct effects than indirect effects, although Miles (1989) found that many regimes 
produce greater effects through indirect means than direct means. Regimes commonly produce 
effects outside the issue areas that constitute their primary concerns. Such external effects can be 
caused by physical and biological linkages (e.g. when success in restoring one species leads to 
increased pressure on other species). They may also take the form of demonstration or other 
cognitive effects. Although the distinction between positive and negative effects is 
straightforward analytically, it requires difficult judgments in practice. What looks like progress 
to one analyst may represent a "local maximum" that actually detracts from the achievement of 
an optimal solution.14 Though there are exceptions, most research on the effectiveness of 
international regimes focuses on direct and positive effects within a given issue area. 
5.3 Causal Bases of Effectiveness 
All the definitions of effectiveness imply some causal connection between the 
institution and the relevant behavioral changes. As JBrgen Wettestad and Steinar Andresen 
(1991) have pointed out, the real measure of a regime's effectiveness involves a comparison with 
what would have happened if the regime had never existed. This requires a demonstration of the 
causal links between the operation of the institution and the behavior of the relevant actors. l5 A 
regime that fares poorly in terms of simple before-and-after comparisons may look more 
successful when causal links and counterfactuals are taken into account. GAIT, for example, 
may seem relatively ineffective if we look only at the slow progress toward the removal of non- 
tariff barriers over the past twenty years. Yet it appears considerably more effective when we ask 
what the pattern of international trade would have been during that period without GAIT. 
Scholars have employed a number of analytical techniques to sort out the true effects 
of international regimes from mere correlations that do not reflect causal links. We can group 
these techniques, which should be treated as a set of tools to be used in conjunction with one 
another, into two broad categories: natural experiments and thought experiments. 
The facts that we cannot conduct laboratory experiments involving international 
regimes and that the number of truly comparable cases is normally too small to allow for the use 
of standard statistical procedures clearly put us at a disadvantage in efforts to measure 
effectiveness. We face a problem much Like that confronting those who seek to understand major 
episodes of biological extinctions or significant changes in the Earth's climate system. But as 
these comparisons suggest, there are techniques of analysis that can help us to deal with this 
problem. We can make use of natural or quasi-experiments (Campbell and Stanley 1966) by 
exploring comparisons across different issues areas or over time within a single evolving regime 
in such a way as to take advantage of variation on the independent variable. This involves 
examining situations that are comparable except for the presence or absence of a regime (or 
particular type of regime) or situations that remain largely unchanged over time except for 
alterations in the character of the prevailing regime. The case of oil pollution before and after the 
introduction of equipment standards (Mitchell 1994b) is a case in point. If the two distinct 
14 Some environmentalists have criticized efforts to improve safety provisions for East European and former 
Soviet nuclear reactors on these grounds. 
15 The Dartmouth project on effectiveness distinguishes "first order effectiveness" (a correlation of raw 
outcomes) from "sophisticated effectivenessw (a correlation combined with a demonstration of causal links). 
institutional configurations correspond closely with observable differences in outcomes, we can 
infer that there is a good chance that these differences are attributable to the institutional 
variable. Given the nature of such experiments, it is important not to overestimate the 
significance of the inferences drawn. Observed differences in outcomes may well be results of 
concomitant but unnoticed variations across our cases in factors other than the institutional 
variable. Nonetheless, this is an exercise well worth pursuing as one means of separating 
institutional effects from the causal forces invoked in various rival hypotheses. 
To complement the findings derivable from natural experiments, we can also make 
use of thought experiments. Specifically, students of regimes have turned to what has become 
known in the recent international relations literature as the method of counterfactuals (Fearon 
1991, Biersteker 1993). In effect, this technique involves a rigorous effort to recontruct the flow 
of events as it would have unfolded in the absence of some key factor (e.g. the introduction of a 
particular regime or social practice) and to compare the results with the actual flow of events. 
What would have happened, for example, if those responsible for the oil pollution regime had 
not shifted from discharge standards to equipment standards? Similarly, how would the problem 
of transboundary air pollution in Europe have evolved if the players had not seized the 
opportunity afforded by the initiation of the CSCE process and the lull in the cold war to reach 
agreement on the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1979? Clearly, this sort of analysis can 
become sloppy and lose its value in the hands of careless analysts. The keys to success in such 
endeavors involve framing counterfactuals as precisely as possible and delving deeply into 
behavior of key actors at critical junctures. This means looking at decision-making processes 
within regime members, focusing on important branching points where events might have taken 
a different course, and asking what path would have been followed if the regime had not existed. 
Terms like process tracing and thick description (Geertz 1973) are often used to characterize this 
method of probing the causal links between regimes and their effects. 
Although no single procedure can be expected to yield definitive proof, applying this 
set of analytical techniques to a growing collection of international regimes offer the prospect of 
building up an increasingly well-defmed picture of the role of institutions as determinants of 
collective outcomes in international society. This effort is unlikely to yield dramatic conclusions 
to the effect that institutions are always critical determinants of outcomes or, conversely, that 
institutions never matter. Rather, we can expect to move toward more realistic and interesting 
conclusions by identifying conditions that determine when regimes matter and the extent to 
which these arrangements matter in a variety of social settings that are typical of international 
society. 
5.4 Review of Hypotheses and Evidence16 
We turn now to an appraisal of the state of empirical knowledge about what makes 
international regimes more or less effective. This involves a review of three bodies of literature: 
(1) work emphasizing exogenous factors or factors external to institutions, (2) work looking to 
endogenous or internal sources of effectiveness, and (3) work seeking to identify behavioral 
mechanisms linking institutional characteristics with collective outcomes. 
16 This section draws liberally from Levy (1993b). 
5.4.1 Exogenous Factors 
Much of the scholarly interest in regime effectiveness has focused on exogenous 
factors. In this account, we separate out the following clusters of factors: the pattern of interests 
in the relevant issue area, the distribution of influence among the participants, and the role of 
structural constraints (e.g. the capacity to monitor behavior, the state of scientific knowledge, or 
the occurrence of shocks and crises). 
Patterns of interests. The behavioral changes international regimes seek to 
promote almost always have negative consequences for some sets of interests: power plants are 
asked to install sulfur dioxide scrubbers to reduce acid rain, protected manufacturers have to 
compete with lower tariffs. It is possible that some interests will be positively affected as well. 
Owners of commercial timber stocks will benefit from reductions in acid rain; consumers and 
exporters benefit from lower tariffs. 
The configuration of negatively and positively affected interests constrains the 
ability of international institutions to affect behavior. Many accounts of the early phases of the 
European acid rain case, for example, stressed the distribution of interests as imposing an 
overwhelming constraint on the ability of the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution (LRTAP) to bring about behavioral changes. A few low-pollution states suffered the 
bulk of the damage from acid rain, whereas high-pollution states either suffered little damage 
(e.g. Britain) or had no interest in preventing such damage (e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany). Even though this factor has received sustained attention in the analysis of regime 
formation, however, it has lurked in the shadows of the effectiveness debate (Kay and Jacobson 
1983). Nonetheless, in case studies of the effectiveness of individual regimes, the distribution of 
interests consistently emerges as an important factor. 
Distribution of influence. Another line of inquiry examines how the distribution of 
influence among the participants affects the ability of an institution to succeed at its task. There 
are debates over what types of distribution and what types of influence promote effectiveness. 
As with the claims made about the impact of interests, most discussions of this factor have taken 
the form of ad hoc claims made with respect to specific institutions; there has been less sustained 
effort aimed at uncovering general causal relationships. 
The distribution of coercive power appears to affect an institution's ability to bring 
about behavioral changes. American fishing quotas in its exclusive economic zone provided a 
power resource used to promote compliance with International Whaling Commission (WC) 
quotas (Andresen 1989, Peterson 1992). American oil imports, combined with a threat to impose 
unilateral regulations on tankers entering its ports, gave the United States influence that led to 
tightening MARPOL standards (M'Gonigle and Zacher 1979). Clearly, coercive power by itself 
is no guarantee of success; it must be concentrated among proponents of institutional objectives. 
According to one strand of hegemonic stability theory, a concentration of coercive power in a 
state that supports institutional goals is virtually a necessary condition for institutional success 
(Gilpin 1987). This conclusion is based on the argument that in situations characterized by 
mixed motives (in which actors have an interest in collective restraint but also would like to 
shirk and let others bear the burden), an enforcer is required to prevent "free riding." Another 
strand of theorizing also concludes that a concentration of influence is required for institutions to 
be effective, but focuses on less coercive forms of influence. Accordingly, individual leadership 
is a necessary condition for institutional success (Young and Osherenko, eds., 1993). Such 
leadership might take the form of political entrepreneurship or intellectual persuasion as well as 
efforts to bring structural power to bear on a problem. The conclusion that leadership is 
necessary is based in part on the deductive argument that institutional success requires a 
cementing of complex bargains that states, left to their own devices, will be unable to realize. It 
is based also on empirical work that every successful case of regime creation studied in the 
project featured a pivotal role for leadership. 
Peter Haas has focused attention on one particular form of non-coercive influence 
featuring the role of "epistemic communities." In a comparative study of efforts to protect 
regional seas, which builds on his study of the Mediterranean Action Plan, Haas (1992) finds 
that the following conditions have prevailed in most successful regional seas efforts: (1) the 
presence of a regional community of able marine scientists interested in environmental 
management, (2) "[rlespect by political decision makers for the authority and expertise of these 
scientists," and (3) the existence of channels of contact or influence between the scientific 
community and national policy makers. 
A related argument points to the distribution of capacity as a factor affecting the 
success of regimes. Some institutions seek adjustment on the part of actors who simply lack the 
capacity to make the necessary changes. States with weak administrative and legal institutions 
often cannot comply with an institution's directives, even when they have an interest in doing so. 
Institutions with large numbers of low-capacity states as members will tend to fail more often 
than institutions seeking to influence the behavior of high-capacity states. Monetary agreements 
often break down, for example, when they require actions that are beyond the capacity of central 
banks. Putnam's "involuntary defection" constitutes a clear example of capacity-driven failure 
(1988). 
Nature of the issue area. Finally, some institutions may do better than others 
because they operate in a relatively benign issue area. Some international problems, for example, 
are marked by unambiguous shocks and crises; others sneak up on relevant actors and do not 
galvanize them to action until it is too late. The case of regulating oil tankers reveals what can 
happen when lots of shocks and crises occur. Successful regulatory action began as early as 
1954, following massive oil slicks on British beaches; a series of tanker accidents since then has 
helped maintain pressure that has been translated into a steady tightening of rules governing 
safety and operational standards of tankers. It is hard to imagine MARPOL evolving in this 
direction in the absence of these high-visibility shocks. The publicization of Waldsterben in 
1981-82 and the ozone hole in 1985-86 also appear to have boosted the effectiveness of the 
regimes established to deal with acid rain and ozone depletion. Other problems do not provide 
such early warnings, and institutions designed to address them have encountered greater barriers 
to success. This is arguably the case with regard to most fisheries: time lags often delay the 
emergence of crises until stocks have been drawn down so low that no effective institutional 
responses are available. A similar situation may explain the limited success of attempts to cope 
with the LDC debt crisis; the crisis became apparent to policymakers after the problem had 
become highly intractable. 
Another factor that can influence effectiveness is the ability to monitor the behavior 
of relevant actors. Where such ability is high, actors will be more willing to engage in mutual 
self-restraint, knowing that they will be able to detect violations on the part of others and 
respond accordingly. Where monitoring is difficult or impossible, by contrast, actors will worry 
that they will be unable to detect violations and therefore be less willing to undertake measures 
due to a fear of being cheated. In such cases, actors willing to bring pressure to bear on violators 
will be unable to determine who deserves their wrath. Monitoring of international fisheries, for 
example, is especially problematic due to the highly fragmented nature of the industry and the 
fact that most actual harvesting occurs far out of sight. This may be an important factor in 
explaining why few fisheries regimes have succeeded in preserving the relevant stocks. 
Concluding thoughts on exogenous factors. Scholars who emphasize exogenous 
factors as sources of institutional effectiveness must address a fundamental objection: if the 
exogenous forces seem so influential, how can we attribute a causal role to the institution? Many 
analysts fail to confront this question directly, and their claims suffer as a result. In theory, there 
is nothing incompatible with strong influence from exogenous forces and a positive role for 
institutions. Consider, for example, the effectiveness of post-WWII economic arrangements as 
compared to the abortive attempts of the 1920s. Many accounts stress the greater interest in 
cooperation in the postwar period as the key factor. But this does not mean that the Bretton 
Woods institutions were unimportant. If an institution performs important functions that could 
not have been handled in its absence, then changed interests are insufficient to explain greater 
cooperation. Yet most treatments of cooperation that stress exogenous factors treat the 
relationship between exogenous factors and the roles institutions play sloppily, blurring the 
distinction between exogenous causes of behavior and exogenous constraints on the ability of 
institutions to influence behavior. Haas's list of exogenous "preconditions" for effective regional 
seas regimes, for example, is the same as his list of UNEP's institutional objectives, a fact that 
makes it impossible to distinguish cases in which the institution made a difference from those in 
which it merely allowed external events to take their course. One way to avoid this pitfall is to 
present explicit causal arguments, specifying exactly what the initial conditions are, what the 
institutional response and exogenous forces are, and how these factors interact causally to 
produce the observed outcome.17 
5.4.2 Endogenous Factors 
The search for endogenous sources of effectiveness is based on the premise that 
there are good and bad ways of structuring international institutions as well as good and bad 
ways of administering these arrangements operationally. Getting the rules right, engaging 
energetic and creative secretariats, and initiating the right kinds of programmatic activities may 
be important determinants of effectiveness. Analytically, this means that we may be able to 
explain variation in institutional effectiveness in terms of variation in these endogenous features. 
AU such efforts must tackle an age-old source of criticism. It is possible that variation in 
endogenous features is perfectly correlated with variation in interests and power capabilities, so 
that these endogenous factors themselves carry no independent explanatory weight. Some 
17 Because most of the studies referred to in this paragraph were not aimed at answering questions about 
effectiveness, this shortcoming does not necessarily reflect negatively on them. 
institutions may be "designed to fail" by actors who covertly want them to fail (Moe 1991); 
others may be blessed with effective design features because powerful actors want them to 
succeed. In either case, the most persuasive explanation lies in the interests and power 
capabilities of the relevant actors; the endogenous features are derivative. One way to avoid this 
pitfall is to control for relevant exogenous variables before seeking for differences in outcomes 
that correlate with differences in endogenous variables. These methodological problems 
notwithstanding, a number of analysts have formulated propositions about institutional 
effectiveness featuring factors endogenous to international regimes. In this account, we divide 
these into propositions concerning design features of international regimes and propositions 
about programmatic activities of regimes. 
Design features. The view that an institution's origins shape its destiny is as old as 
politics itself. Ever since practitioners and theorists began arguing about proper forms of 
constitutions, they have acted on the premise that the design features embedded in political 
institutions affect the ability of those institutions to carry out the tasks assigned to them. From 
Plato's ruminations on the best way to organize a city-state in order to make justice flourish, to 
Rousseau's ideas on what sorts of political organizations make freedom possible, to Madison's 
thoughts on how federal constitutions can prevent tyranny, and right on to recent debates over 
how to reform the European Union's institutions, we see a clear concern with institutional design 
features as important sources of effectiveness. 
Among recent students of institutions, Elinor Ostrom (1990) has most consistently 
and rigorously addressed questions of institutional design, though she has only recently turned 
her attention to international issues. McGinnis and Ostrom (1992) provide a set of "design 
principles" that they claim contribute to the effectiveness of international institutions for the 
management of common pool resources. These principles point to factors endogenous to the 
institutions "that help to account for the success of these institutions in sustaining the [common 
pool resources] and gaining the compliance of generation after generation of participants" (1992, 
2). The specific design principles McGinnis and Ostrom propose are derived from a long-term 
study of domestic institutions established to manage common pool resources; these authors give 
plausible reasons for presuming that lessons drawn from a study of domestic institutions will 
prove relevant to international regimes, though they do not subject this view to the same level of 
rigorous testing that Ostrom has carried out for domestic institutions. The basis of their 
conclusions is therefore a mixture of rigorous testing (at the level of proposition-generation) and 
theoretical conjecture (at the level of proposition-testing). McGinnis and Ostrom summarize 
their principles for institutional success as follows: 
Rights to utilize resources are clearly defined, as are the boundaries of the resource in 
question. 
Rules match local circumstances. 
Individuals affected by operational rules have an opportunity to participate in modifying the 
rules. 
Monitoring of resource health and participant behavior is conducted 
by agents accountable to the participants. 
Violators are subject to graduated sanctions. 
Participants have access to low-cost arenas of conflict resolution. 
The rights of participants to devise their own institutions are not challenged by other 
authorities. 
Institutional activity is organized in multiple, nested layers. 
Few, if any, of these design principles have been explored systematically across a 
range of international regimes; they remain hypotheses in need of testing. An empirical study 
recently completed by Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes (1993, 1995) reports interim results 
that confirm these ideas only partially. Chayes and Chayes support the importance of the first 
principle, concluding that many cases of non-compliance stem from "ambiguity and 
indeterminacy of treaty language" (1993, 188-189). However, they find that international 
institutions virtually never utilize sanctions to achieve their goals. Conflict resolution 
mechanisms are sometimes important sources of compliance, they find, but in many cases they 
amount to boilerplate arrangements with little political effect. 
Other analysts have produced independent assessments of design features. Ronald 
Mitchell (1994a) examines efforts to reduce operational discharges of oil from tankers and 
reaches several conclusions about ways in which endogenous features of international 
institutions shape their effectiveness. He finds, for example, that rules aimed at ship builders 
have been more effective than rules aimed at ship operators, and he draws the general lesson that 
rules are more effective when they target actors who have the greatest incentive to comply. (In a 
sense, this is a specific manifestation of the second principle of McGinnis and Ostrom.) 
Peter Sand (1990) has formulated yet another set of design options, which he claims 
promote effective institutional responses to environmental problems. These include: 
Allowing for interim operation, before entry-into-force, 
Utilizing soft-law to promote action when binding rules are politically impossible, 
Delegating decision-making power to a specialized body, 
Setting standards at a regional rather than the global level, 
Providing selective incentives, including technology and finances, 
Setting differential obligations, rather than common standards (see also Parson and 
Zeckhauser 1994), 
Conducting regular reviews of institutional performance (also see Lee 1993). 
Sand offers trenchant illustrations for each of his propositions. From the perspective 
of political science, however, they also remain hypotheses in need of testing rather than 
empirically tested propositions. They require analysis involving behavior rather than law, and 
this means detailed case studies including some comparative studies of cases in which 
institutions with such provisions are compared to regimes without them. 
The need to focus on behavior is critical, because we must ultimately change the 
behavior of actors to solve international problems. It is possible that wily political actors will 
respond to improved legal rules with evasive behavioral action, leaving the underlying problem 
unsolved. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), for example, adopted in 1973 a 
change in rules governing amendments to MARPOL that took effect in 1983. Rather than 
requiring formal ratification in each case, amendments now enter into force automatically after 
16 months, unless more than one third of the parties representing more than 50% of world 
shipping tonnage issue objections. This has had the effect of generating improved law: 
amendments enter into force quickly, rather than suffering from the problem of being held 
hostage for years to states that withhold ratification - often amendments would not enter into 
force until after they were made obsolete by newer amendments (Mitchell 1993). Yet it is not 
clear that this has had any effect at all on state behavior. A comparison of amendments to 
MARPOL before and after the changed entry-into-force procedure suggests that states have 
responded to the new procedure by passing nothing but very weak amendments (Underdal 
1992). 
A number of authors interested in effectiveness have emphasized the importance of 
the ways in which scientific and technical advice is institutionalized. Edward A. Parson has 
found that the design of the Montreal Protocol's scientific and technical committees fostered the 
development of productive scientific consensus, creative problem solving, and lowered political 
posturing. Specifically, the constitution of these bodies as non-governmental entities has helped 
ensure that only qualified experts serve and that they do so in the name of their disciplines rather 
than their governments (Parson 1993). Other studies emphasizing the organization of scientific 
advice in determining the effectiveness of institutional arrangements include works by Ernst 
Haas, Peter Haas, and Edward Miles (E. Haas 1990, P. Haas 1989, Miles 1989). All these 
analysts argue that effective institutional responses require organizational designs giving agenda- 
setting power to individuals who share a common, scientific approach to knowledge and 
problem solving. Boehmer-Christiansen (1989), on the other hand, offers a more skeptical view 
on this topic. 
Programmatic activities. To be effective institutions may require not only the right 
beginnings, but also a well-constructed set of programmatic activities. Kay and Jacobson (1983, 
Conclusion) list a number of operational factors that contribute to organizational success: 
recognizing and nurturing competence, emergence of dynamic leadership, ability to perform 
basic organizational tasks (e.g. typing, translation), and imagination and creativity. All of these 
are factors endogenous to institutions yet not determined by their constitution. They reflect the 
choices actors make and the actions they take within the framework of existing institutions. 
Mitchell has found that compliance with reporting requirements improves greatly 
when secretariats submit questionnaires prompting specific government officials to provide the 
required information (Mitchell 1994). More generally, some secretariats take on political roles, 
seeking to embarrass or cajole laggards, while others prefer to stay out of the picture and let the 
parties fight their political battles on their own. It is not clear which of these strategies is most 
effective, and the answer may well depend on the nature of the circumstances. 
Some observers have pointed to flexibility or adaptability as a source of 
effectiveness. (Flexibility might be considered a matter of design as well as an operational issue; 
its inclusion in this section is not meant to indicate otherwise.) Thus, GATT's flexibility is often 
pointed to as one of the sources of its effectiveness. Chayes and Chayes argue more generally 
that compliance with the terms of regulative treaties improves when they are administered in a 
flexible manner, allowing some leeway for "acceptable" levels of non-compliance. It is worth 
pointing out as well that an element of what might be called "professionalism" (i.e. the absence 
of cronyism, patronage and corruption; rewarding performance according to merit, etc.) 
probably makes for more effective regimes. Some regimes get captured by ambitious, self- 
serving bureaucrats, while others - perhaps because their budgets make them small prizes - 
remain in the hands of professionals. 
Concluding thoughts on endogenous factors. The endogenous factors 
contributing to the effectiveness of international institutions have been subjected to less rigorous 
testing than the exogenous factors. Political scientists have tended, to date, to extend ongoing 
debates about international relations more generally into the study of regimes. It so happens that 
at the time political scientists became interested in international regimes most of these debates 
centered on exogenous factors (mainly pertaining to power and interests). If research on regimes 
had blossomed eighty years ago, prevailing theoretical debates would probably have focused 
more attention on endogenous factors. As a result, there has been a divide between those 
applying rigorous, scientific methods to questions of limited practical utility, and those asking 
politically important questions but employing much less reliable methods in determining the 
answers. In the succeeding paragraphs, we discuss one strategy for overcoming this problem. 
Endopenous Factors Exogenous Factors 
Design features Configuration of Interests 
Form of rules Distribution of Influence 
Participation provisions Coercion 
Monitoring Nerification provisions Leadership 
Dispute resolution provisions Epistemic Communities 
Programmatic activities Nature of Issue Area 
Flexibility 
Performance reviews 
Mixture of binding and non-binding Instruments 
Professionalism 
Secretariat activities 
Table 2: Factors That Determine Levels of Effectiveness 
5.4.3 Behavioral Mechanisms 
When international regimes operate effectively, they make use of endogenous facts 
(rules, procedures, programs) to alter exogenous facts (patterns of influence and interest, 
behavior of actors). An understanding of the phenomenon of effectiveness therefore requires 
analysis at both levels; attempts to discover pieces of the puzzle exclusively within one level or 
the other are bound to yield inconclusive results. What we need in order to understand 
effectiveness, then, are studies of how the design features and programmatic activities of 
institutions interact with the configurations of interests and patterns of influence within which 
they operate. Isolated case studies do exist, but we have not yet made much progress toward 
cumulative knowledge in the area that will prove useful to both theorists and practitioners. 
One promising approach that has surfaced recently in the study of international 
regimes is to focus attention on behavioral mechanisms highlighting specific causal links 
between institutional facts and behavioral outcomes. Such an effort does not replace work aimed 
at deepening our understanding of exogenous and endogenous forces determining effectiveness. 
Instead, it can help us make more sense of the overall phenomenon by providing a non-arbitrary 
way to link knowledge of the two levels. 
It can be argued that international environmental regimes achieve effectiveness by 
carrying out three central tasks (Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993, Conclusion): increasing 
concern, improving the contractual environment, and increasing the capacity of governments. 
These mechanisms - the three C's - link institutions with their external environment. The 
appropriate mixture of institutional strategies depends on the state of the political environment in 
which an institution is located. Low levels of concern, poor contractual environments, and weak 
capacity are each sufficient to cause failures in collective management of environmental risks. 
Therefore, where any of these conditions prevails, institutions must intervene to ameliorate them 
in order to achieve their goals. When concern and capacity are high, an institution need only 
augment the ability of members to make and keep contracts to succeed. This may have been the 
case with regard to postwar trade cooperation among advanced industrial states. If concern is 
also lacking, institutions must engage in activities that boost concern. The acid rain regime in 
Europe succeeded in doing this, in part by creating scientific working groups and providing 
forums to embarrass laggards. The nuclear non-proliferation regime tries to do this by imposing 
sanctions on violators. Where capacity is also weak, institutions must operate to augment 
capacity in order to be effective. The IMF seeks to do this by helping governments reform 
policies and domestic institutions. 
The contributors to the volume edited by Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1993) 
discovered the significance of these causal mechanisms more-or-less inductively, through an 
effort to develop and interpret seven case studies. But there is a clear need for a more systematic 
examination of behavioral mechanisms. An alternative classification of behavioral mechanisms 
underlies the Dartmouth-based project on effectiveness currently nearing completion. These 
mechanisms, specified deductively and subsequently elaborated through empirical 
investigations, are summarized in the succeeding paragraphs (Levy and Young 1994). 
Regimes as utility modifiers. The causal mechanism underlying this model draws 
on the tradition that views actors as self-interested utility maximizers. It posits that actors' 
behavior can be guided by institutional arrangements to the extent that they alter the costs and 
benefits individual actors attach to well-defined options. Actors change their behavior if and 
when the rules of the game make it worth their while to do so. The essential logic is one of 
linkage. Regimes modify utility calculations by linking issues that were otherwise not linked. 
They threaten penalties for non-compliance, for example, or they promise rewards for 
compliance. 
Regimes as enhancers of cooperation. Although this model also rests on utilitarian 
premises, it is helpful to separate it out for individual treatment because it directs attention to the 
collective-action problems which are widely viewed among students of international relations as 
important obstacles to the achievement of sustained cooperation. The essential point is that there 
are many circumstances under which rational actors engaged in interactive decision-making fail 
to avoid joint losses or reap joint gains due to the effects of strategic behavior. Regimes, on this 
account, emerge as mechanisms for alleviating these problems and allowing the participants to 
achieve collective outcomes that lie closer to the Pareto frontier. Because collective-action 
problems take a variety of forms, regimes created to alleviate these problems can affect behavior 
in a number of ways. They may, for example, serve to mitigate fears of cheating through 
measures designed to increase the transparency of the behavior of relevant actors. They may 
reduce incentives to defect either by calling sanctions down upon violators or by lengthening the 
shadow of the future with regard to the issues in question. Or they may simply reduce 
transaction costs by making it unnecessary to cope with the consequences of strategic behavior 
again and again in the same issue area. But the basic point remains the same. In this model, 
regimes affect behavior by mitigating the collective-action problems that stand as barriers to the 
avoidance of joint losses or the realization of joint gains otherwise available to parties engaged 
in interactive decision-making. Much of the recent literature on international regimes has 
proceeded on the assumption that this is their principal function. 
Regimes as bestowers of authority. The basic premise of this model is that the 
behavior of states and non-state actors alike is often rooted in a respect for authority, rather than 
in some sort of utilitarian calculus concerning the benefits and costs of options available to them. 
In the case of individuals, this is apt to be a consequence of socialization. Most people are taught 
to act in certain ways because it is the right and proper thing to do or because it is the law, rather 
than because it is in their self-interest to do so. In general, people are most likely to respond in 
this way when they feel that the authority in question is legitimate and deserving of their respect. 
Those who have escaped the grip of the resultant "habit of obedience" (Hart 1961) and who 
routinely question authority are the exceptions in most social settings. When we come to 
collective entities, on the other hand, the behavior this model points to is apt to be as much a 
consequence of routinization as of socialization. More often than not, agencies charged with the 
implementation of regimes come to treat the fulfillment of this goal as part of their 
organizational mission to be pursued without constant questioning of the social consequences 
flowing from the rules in question and defended in dealings with other agencies pursuing their 
own missions. In both cases, however, it is the authoritativeness of regime rules and activities 
that triggers the behavioral response rather than some calculation of the anticipated benefits and 
costs associated with different options available to decision-makers. Those who think in 
utilitarian, much less realist or neo-realist, terms may find it hard to believe that behavior of this 
sort is prevalent at the international level, whatever its status in domestic society. But it would be 
a mistake to rule out this source of behavior in examining the behavioral mechanisms that give 
rise to the effects of international regimes. 
Regimes as learning facilitators. Institutions, in this model, achieve their effects 
by initiating processes that give rise to individual and social learning. The learning in question 
can take the form of new perspectives on the nature of a problem to be solved, new ideas about 
measures likely to prove effective in solving the problem, or new insights into the process of 
implementing these measures. The route to such learning may lead either through the generation 
of new facts that reduce uncertainty or produce a more accurate picture of the issues at stake or 
through the reassessment of values and a resultant redefinition of actor interests. The evidence 
suggests, for example, that the LRTAP regime has played a role not only in enhancing our 
understanding of the mechanisms at work in long-range air pollution but also in energizing a 
broader process of consciousness raising regarding the importance of the impacts of air pollution 
on human health and natural systems. The actual processes through which learning occurs are 
not well understood. Thus, we need to improve our grasp of the roles of individual leaders, 
communities of scientists, and epistemic communities in the learning process. But the essential 
point of this model is clear enough. It spotlights the roles that regimes play in changing 
information and values and, in the process, altering the incentives and interests that shape the 
behavior of individuals and collective entities active in the issue areas covered by the regimes. 
Regimes as role definers. Yet another behavioral model emphasizes the fact that 
regimes sometimes operate at the constitutive level, shaping the identity (and therefore the 
interests) of actors and, in the process, influencing the way actors behave as occupants of the 
roles to which they are assigned. Most of us are accustomed to forms of contractarianism that 
treat actors and their interests as given and proceed to analyze the bargaining processes through 
which such actors endeavor to hammer out the terms of social contracts. But it is perfectly 
possible to turn this analysis on its head and look at the ways in which institutions operate to 
define and assign roles. In fact, actors regularly take on new roles under the terms of institutional 
arrangements, even when their basic identities are well established prior to the emergence of the 
rules in question. Consider the striking changes in the roles of flag, coastal, and port states under 
the new law of the sea and, more specifically, the rules relating to exclusive economic zones and 
marine pollution as cases in point. The enhanced role of coastal states certainly helped Norway 
and Russia to phase out third party fishing in the Barents Sea, and the growing strength of 
coastal and port states in relation to flag states appears to be a factor of some significance in the 
case of oil pollution. Of course, the redefinition of old roles or the creation of new roles may in 
turn reflect the evolution of underlying ideas regarding relevant issues. But the key point here is 
that the causal mechanism associated with this model directs our attention to sources of behavior 
that lie behind or beneath the sorts of factors identified in utilitarian arguments. 
Regimes as agents of internal realignments. What distinguishes this model from 
the others is its emphasis on the proposition that both the members of international regimes and 
others active in the relevant behavioral complexes need not be treated as unitary actors. 
Regimes, on this account, affect behavior by creating new constituencies or shifting the balance 
among factions or subgroups vying for influence within individual actors. In the simplest cases, 
the establishment of a regime gives some of those involved in an issue area new ammunition in 
their dealings with others. The East-West Helsinki Accord, for instance, may have bolstered 
American human rights advocates in their battles with proponents of detente. Beyond this, 
regimes can actually play some role in restructuring the alignment of domestic groups 
endeavoring to influence a government's behavior or factions seeking to redirect a corporation's 
behavior. GATT may have played such a role in breaking the long-standing regional and party 
divisions on tariff issues that formerly dominated American politics. 
5.5 Conclusions on Effectiveness 
Analysis regarding the mechanisms through which regimes succeed or fail has been 
overshadowed by debates over whether international institutions matter at all and by efforts to 
explain their creation. Because the regime creation literature has reached a degree of maturity 
(see Section 3). and because we now know that determining whether regimes matter requires us 
to demonstrate how they matter, much more attention is being directed at this juncture to 
questions of effectiveness. Promising work has been carried out on exogenous and endogenous 
sources of effectiveness. Improving our understanding of the overall phenomenon, however, will 
require non-arbitrary ways to link the two sets of factors. The analysis of behavioral mechanisms 
is one promising vehicle for doing so. 
The three C's (Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993) and the six behavioral mechanisms 
(Levy and Young 1994) are two complementary models for elaborating causal pathways. The 
three C's, for their part, are each quite broad, encompassing a wide range of specific 
mechanisms. The single category "concern," for example, touches on all but one of the six 
Dartmouth mechanisms (enhancers of cooperation). Many of the Dartmouth mechanisms also 
pertain to each of the three C's. "Utility modification," for example, can play a role in raising 
concern, building capacity, or enhancing the contractual environment. This highdegree of 
complementary overlap suggests the possibility of a two-dimensional map of behavioral 
mechanisms. Although it is not clear whether such a two-dimensional map would be the most 
productive line of future elaboration, it is clear that more work along these lines is called for. 
6. REGIME CONSEQUENCES - BROADER EFFECTS 
All approaches to assessing the effectiveness of regimes share an interest in 
determining the extent to which institutions affect outputs, outcomes, and impacts in the issue 
areas these arrangements address. But in the real world, issue areas are not neatly separated. 
Developments in one issue area often have substantial consequences for other issue areas. Some 
ecologists, for instance, claim that the recently concluded Uruguay Round of GAIT negotiations 
will have serious adverse consequences for the global environment. As this example suggests, 
most consequences external to an issue area - whether positive or negative - are not intended by 
those who design regimes producing such effects. External consequences are products of a 
functionally differentiated society, the overall complexity of which is too great to allow 
policymakers to foresee all effects of a given measure. Equally important, regimes focused on 
specific issues affect not only other issue areas but also the broader or deeper structure of 
international society as a whole. It is especially important to probe the links between 
international regimes and the underlying constitutive principles of international society (e.g. 
state sovereignty). Without an understanding of this relationship, the study of international 
governance remains truncated. 
Analyzing the broader effects of international regimes, however, is difficult. In 
addition to the complications discussed in the preceding section on effectiveness, studies of 
broader effects have to overcome at least three other obstacles. In the first place, regime analysts 
devote a lot of effort to becoming specialists regarding the issue areas they study. Any single 
person will find it extremely difficult to maintain a level of information about other international 
issue areas that would allow for informed judgments about broader effects. Moreover, the range 
of possible broader effects of a given international regime is unlimited. Because regime analysis 
has not yet developed a well-defined method for the study of broader effects, a common 
dependent variable to be used in formulating generalizable statements is still missing in this 
field. What is more, one strand of social theory maintains that the process of functional 
differentiation in international society has reached a point where causal and interactive 
complexities make it impossible for policymakers and analysts alike to comprehend the full 
range of broader effects arising from the operation of specific regimes. 
Overall, the study of broader regime consequences is both an important and an 
especially difficult task for students of international institutions. This means that the study of 
broader effects will always contain an element of speculation. On a very general level, however, 
we may differentiate broader regime consequences on the basis of whether they affect states and 
interstate relations or international society and transnational relations. At each level, it is helpful 
to ask whether broader consequences affect actor capabilities, interests, cognitive matters, or 
constitutive principles. 
6.1 States and Interstate Relations 
Regimes often redistribute issue-specific resources among their members. Yet actors 
can make use of some resources across issue areas or trade them for additional issue-specific 
resources. The renunciation of nuclear weapons by Germany and Japan in the nuclear non- 
proliferation regime, for instance, increased their dependence on American security resources. In 
the early 1970s, at least, the United States was able to utilize this situation to extract concessions 
in the economic sphere. With the exception of the work of Joseph Grieco (1990), who maintains 
that an unequal distribution of benefits from cooperation constitutes an insurmountable obstacle 
to regime building in an anarchical society, little effort has been made so far too explore the 
broader consequences of regime impacts on the distribution of state capacities. 
Recent studies have emphasized that regimes are not simply static complexes of 
rules and norms. They may also serve as important vehicles for individual and social learning. 
Of course, some learning features improvements in the understanding of governments about 
cause-effect relationships in a regime's issue area. But a broader type of learning occurs when a 
principle applicable to more than one issue area proves successful in specific cases. The idea of 
"embedded liberalism," for example, arose in connection with international trade after World 
War 11. But over time it became an influential principle in other economic issue areas as well 
(Ruggie 1983, Burley 1993). Similarly, broader effects may occur when a specific international 
regime plays a role in altering general perceptions of other actors. Confidence-building measures 
in East-West relations, for example, contributed to the development of a friendlier image of the 
Soviet Union in Western Europe (Rittberger, Efinger, and Mendler 1990). In addition to 
cognitive changes relating to cause-effect relationships and intentions ascribed to other actors, 
regimes may also affect value hierarchies and, as a result, the formulation of interests. Learning 
about the dangers of global warming as a result of the operation of the climate change regime, 
for instance, may lead to changes that go beyond mere "adaptation" to a redefinition of the goals 
of policy (E. Haas 1990). Such fundamental redefinitions would have effects reaching beyond 
the issue area of climate change, since climate change necessarily involves a host of economic 
issues. 
With respect to constitutive concerns, neo-functionalists and other recent integration 
theorists emphasize that nation-building and international integration are much more results of 
generative processes than conscious decisions. For the most part, the issue of political integration 
arose when people demanded more adequate services of one kind or another from their 
governments. Integration was first considered as a possible means to further these ends rather 
than as an end in itself (Deutsch et al. 1957, 90). Thus, an increasing density of international 
regimes, all created for different purposes, may initiate a take-off towards political integration. 
In this sense, the study of international regimes offers a micro-level approach to understanding 
the macro-level phenomenon of integration. Along the same lines, any given regime not only 
reflects an end toward which the norms and rules are directed, it also involves a procedure for 
regulating conflicts. When international regimes are seen as procedures for the regulation of 
conflict, it becomes plausible to think of these institutions as contributing to a civilizing process 
in international politics, in which the conduct of conflict is institutionalized and does not lead to 
a resort to violence (Rittberger and Zilrn 1990). Interestingly, both integration theory and Elias' 
(1976) theory of civilization highlight the existence of a "core area" or a "hegemon" as a 
prerequisite for such processes. 
6.2 International Society and Transnational Relations 
Compliance with regime rules entails the possibility of domestic redistribution of 
resources. A free-trade regime which favors producers and consumers or certain industrial 
sectors may hurt workers or other sectors. Such effects reach beyond the given issue area by 
empowering certain domestic groups and creating new coalitions that may influence the overall 
foreign policy of a state. Milner (1988) and Rogowski (1989), for example, demonstrate that 
international institutions empowered agents of liberalism in OECD countries, thus creating 
domestic structures that fostered the growth of a general foreign policy orientation that comes 
close to the ideal type of a trading state (Rosecrance 1987). On this account, "domestic social 
actors, not states, are the agents of interdependence" (Milner 1988,291). 
Similarly, international institutions can create opportunities and incentives for 
increased transnational activities on the part of various social actors and, as a result, for the 
emergence of influential transnational coalitions. These coalitions often stimulate social learning 
and promote orientations that favor international cooperation. Since the Single European Act 
strengthened the role of majority voting in the European Union and consequently weakened the 
effect of national vetoes, for example, many European interest groups have opened offices in 
Brussels (Streeck and Schmitter 1991). In the process, this development has created new 
opportunities for the establishment of transnational networks. As students of international 
environmental politics have demonstrated, moreover, the formation of regimes can empower 
issue networks and stimulate the creation of epistemic communities (P. Haas 1992). Although 
the immediate effects of the creation of such networks and communities are normally issue area 
specific, intensified transnational relations provide an important opportunity for ongoing social 
learning likely to have broader effects (Risse-Kappen 1992, Leatherman, Pagnucco, and Smith 
1993). Older studies of transnational relations often emphasized this learning effect. Learning of 
this sort may involve both changes in the way cause-effect relationships are understood within 
and across issue areas and a better grasp of the intentions underlying the actions of others. It may 
also affect the way international actors think of their interests (Jachtenfuchs 1993). 
Moving on to constitutive matters, we turn first to the idea that the redistribution of 
domestic resources and the creation of transnational coalitions, taken together, may produce 
domestic repercussions leading to changes internal political structures. Although this line of 
thinking is highly speculative, there is no reason to exclude it from a study of broader 
consequences of regimes, as work on the "second image reversed" (e.g. Katzenstein 1984) 
clearly demonstrates. Insofar as international regimes contribute to the rise of transnational issue 
networks, epistemic communities, and transnational social movements, moreover, they 
contribute to the growth of challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty and community. In a 
sweeping statement, Camilleri and Falk (1992,232) portray transnational movements as sources 
of ".. support for a new system of multiple allegiances and jurisdictions, held together not by 
supreme authority but by an emerging world culture and a dynamic network of communities, 
movements and organizations." As the European Union example demonstrates, shifts in 
policymaking hierarchies may also affect the loyalties of the populace and the boundaries of 
imagined communities in complex ways. Whereas European integration was accompanied for a 
long time by a growing sense of European identity on the part of many, a more nationalist 
counter movement has recently emerged. 
Tracing complex, long-term processes, such as the impact of international regimes 
on domestic structures and on the constitutive principles of international society poses a 
tremendous analytical challenge. Yet it seems important to tackle such matters in order to 
contribute to the discussion of "big questions," involving issues like "the diminished role of state 
sovereignty" and "international governance." Conclusive answers to these questions will not 
come from the study of individual regimes. Studies that cut across issue areas and that compare 
and contrast different regimes are needed in this context. The informational requirements for 
such studies are so great that they cannot be handled effectively by individual scholars working 
alone. The emergence of a number of large, collaborative projects dealing with international 
regimes is therefore an encouraging sign. 
7. THE ROAD AHEAD 
What can we conclude from this survey about current gaps, growth areas, and 
research priorities in the field of regime analysis? As documented in the preceding sections, 
regime analysis has established itself as a going concern - even a growth industry - among 
students of international relations. Despite some continuing debates about definitional matters, 
the concept of international regimes has emerged as an analytically robust construct 
encompassing a sizable universe of cases. Interest has shifted from an initial preoccupation with 
regime formation to a concentrated effort to understand when and how international institutions 
affect collective outcomes in international society, a positive sign in the sense that this is a 
matter that must be confronted successfully if regime analysis is to acquire intellectual staying 
power. What is more, major contributions to this line of inquiry are increasingly coming from 
Europe and beyond, so that it is fair to conclude that regime analysis is more than just another 
passing fancy of the American scholarly community (Rittberger, ed., 1993). 
These are important achievements. But they should not distract us from a 
consideration of current gaps and future directions. In this final section, we turn to a 
consideration of the next phase of regime analysis, singling out a number of areas that require 
more concentrated attention and that show promise of being ripe for such attention in the sense 
that investments of time and energy in analyzing them now are likely to yield sizable dividends 
over the next 5- 10 years. The result is a science agenda for the field of regime analysis. This will 
pave the way for a brief concluding discussion of the role of a regimes database, the construction 
of which provided the initial stimulus for this state-of-the-art survey. To lend focus to the 
assessment that follows, we start each observation about growth areas and research priorities 
with a specific question. 
* How can we supplement contractarian thinking with other modes of thought (e.g. 
agent/structure analysis) in our efforts to understand the nature of international regimes? Most 
studies of regimes assume that potential regime members exist as fully functioning entities prior 
to the emergence of collective-action problems. On this account, actors whose identities, 
interests, and preferences are determined through some exogenous process interact with each 
other in ways that generate collective-action problems and, at some point, realize that they may 
be able to eliminate or alleviate these problems by devising mutually agreeable institutional 
arrangements that will serve to guide their subsequent interactions. The obvious focus then is on 
the processes through which groups of actors endeavor, successfully or unsuccessfully, to arrive 
at social contracts establishing the constitutive rules of regimes. This line of analysis has proved 
rewarding; it has produced much of what we currently know about the dynamics of international 
regimes. Yet it is also important to reverse the relationship between actors and institutions and 
ask when and how prevailing institutions operate to determine, or at least influence, the identities 
and therefore the interests and preferences of the members of a social group. This is exactly what 
analysts like Alexander Wendt, using the agent/structure construct and arguing that social 
structure exerts a substantial influence on the identities of individual members of societies, have 
proposed (Wendt 1987, Wendt 1992). There is a sense also in which the views of neo-realists 
like Kenneth Waltz reflect this mode of thought (Waltz 1979). and such perspectives will surely 
resonate with policymakers acting on behalf of the "new" states that have joined international 
society over the last fifty years. The implications of this reversal of the mainstream view of 
regimes are far-reaching. For example, actors whose identities are derived, in part at least, from 
the character of the social institutions to which they belong will have a dramatically different 
view of the issue of compliance with institutional rules than those whose interests and 
preferences are independent of their institutional memberships. The point of drawing this 
distinction is not to argue that one or the other approach is correct. Rather, the challenge before 
us is to capitalize on the insights emerging from agent/structure perspectives without 
jeopardizing the achievements of mainstream contractarian analyses. 
* To what extent does problem structure or the preexisting constellation of actor 
interests determine the outcomes of efforts to form regimes and the consequences flowing from 
regimes once they are in place? Basing their arguments on models of interactive decision- 
making, many regime analysts have focused on problem structures and interest constellations as 
determinants of success in efforts to solve collective-action problems. The game-theoretically 
inclined, for example, have drawn a distinction between coordination problems (for example, 
battle of the sexes) in which there are stable equilibria and collaboration problems (for instance, 
prisoner's dilemma or chicken) in which equilibria are either suboptimal or absent (Stein 1983, 
Martin 1992, Ziirn 1992). Whereas incentives to cheat and, therefore, concerns about the 
development of compliance mechanisms constitute a central concern in dealing with 
collaboration problems, there is much less need to be worry about such matters in coming to 
terms with coordination problems. Others have focused on measures of the severity or intensity 
of conflicts of interest among interactive decision-makers - the idea of a spectrum ranging from 
pure cooperation to pure or zero-sum conflict is popular in such analyses - and argued that the 
intensity of conflicts of interest or the "malignness" of problems is an important determinant not 
only of success in efforts to create institutions but also of the effectiveness of institutions once 
they are in place (Wettested and Andresen 1991). It is important to distinguish, on this account, 
between types of conflicts such as conflicts about values, which are the most difficult to solve, 
and conflicts about absolutely assessed goods, which are relatively easy to solve (Rittberger und 
Ziirn 1990). Such arguments all assume that problem structures and interest constellations are 
independent of the interactive process itself. Yet there are reasons to believe that many situations 
violate this assumption to a considerable extent. Participants in interactive decision-making 
seldom see themselves as operating in an environment in which the problem is fuced at the 
outset; their interactions frequently have an integrative or productive dimension in the sense that 
the parties learn more about the problem, invent new ways of thinking about it, or even redefine 
the character of the problem itself in their dealings with each other. There is a sense, then, in 
which problems are malleable and problem structure is a variable affected by the interactions of 
participating actors. Under such conditions, actors may devise regimes that are mutually 
beneficial without ever spelling out definitively the structure of the problem they are seeking to 
solve. This is not to deny the insights arising from efforts to differentiate analytically distinct 
problem structures and constellations of interests. But it does suggest that we need to be cautious 
in drawing inferences about regime formation and problem solving from such distinctions. 
* How should we deal with the fact that the members of international regimes - 
sovereign states for the most part - are complex collective entities rather than unitary actors? 
Understandably, most studies of regimes have treated the actors involved in the formation and 
operation of international institutions as rational utility maximizers weighing benefits and costs 
and making choices among clear options. The tractability of models based on this vision has 
played a vital role in producing valuable insights regarding the creation and operation of 
institutional arrangements. Yet this perspective abstracts away many important elements of the 
behavior of actors participating in international regimes. Most actors have crowded political 
agendas, so that efforts to deal with specific regimes are affected by the treatment of other issues 
unfolding simultaneously and may even be shunted aside in the rush to deal with more pressing 
concerns. When actors do focus on specific regimes, they are likely to experience internal 
disagreements over the relative merits of different institutional options at the international level. 
This is the essential idea behind the concept of two-level games, a perspective highlighting the 
fact that the positions actors adopt in international negotiations are products of domestic 
bargaining and that the course of international negotiations, in turn, can become a determinant of 
the course of domestic bargaining (Putnam 1988). Nor do these complications come to an end 
once parties reach agreement on the terms of international regimes. On the contrary, the 
configuration of political forces affecting the implementation of international regimes may differ 
substantially from the line up involved in regime formation. Under the circumstances, regimes in 
practice may differ signXcant;y from the expectations of their creators; regimes agreed to on 
paper may even become non-starters or dead letters in practice. The point of these observations 
is not to deny the value of models assuming unitary actors but rather to highlight the need to 
supplement these models with analyses that recognize the internal processes determining the 
behavior of individual actors regarding the creation and operation of regimes. 
* What are the determinants of the willingness and ability of states to implement the 
provisions of international regimes in dealing with a variety of actors operating under their 
jurisdiction? A distinctive feature of international regimes is that there is often a separation 
between the members of these institutional arrangements (that is, states) and many of those 
whose behavior is their ultimate target (for example, banks, manufacturers, power plants, 
airlines, shipping companies, fishers). For this reason, the implementation of regimes normally 
requires states to translate the provisions of international agreements into domestic prescriptions 
(often, but not always, through the passage of implementing legislation) and to devise means of 
eliciting compliance from targets of these prescriptions who are subject to their jurisdiction. This 
arrangement has some attractions for those concerned about the effectiveness of international 
regimes (for example, it alleviates some concerns about the weakness of compliance mechanisms 
at the international level). At the same time, it highlights the importance of examining the 
willingness and the capacity of member states to implement the provisions of international 
regimes (Jacobson and Weiss 1995, Hanf and Underdal 1995). Predictably, states vary greatly in 
these terms. This is partly a matter of differences relating to political structures. States differ, for 
instance, in the extent to which the provisions of international agreements take precedence 
legally over municipal laws and in the extent to which opponents of international regimes are 
able to make their preferences felt in the policy process. More broadly, this topic directs 
attention to the importance of statelsociety relations in any examination of the effectiveness of 
international regimes. Thus, strong states may be better situated than weak states to guide the 
behavior of actors operating under their jurisdiction. Hierarchical states in which great authority 
is vested in the central government will find it easier to translate the provisions of international 
regimes into national law than decentralized systems in which the central government has 
limited authority over regional and local governments. Similarly, states that own or directly 
control large segments of the means of production in their societies should find it easier to 
exercise control over actor behavior than those operating in social settings featuring private 
property and strict limits on the regulatory authority of the state.Yet it remains an open question 
what kind of domestic structure most effectively changes behavioral patterns toward regime 
goals. It follows that simple generalizations about the domestic implementation of regime 
provisions need to be scrutinized with care. 
* To what extent do we need to supplement (or supplant) the enforcement/sanctions 
model in thinking about compliance with the terms of international regimes? Much thinking 
about social institutions rests on the (often implicit) assumption that the probability of being 
caught and punished is a key determinant of whether subjects elect to comply with or to violate 
the rules. On this account, the absence of a central government capable of enforcing the 
provisions of international regimes is often regarded as a critical weakness of international 
society. In the eyes of some, this problem casts doubt on the whole enterprise of regime analysis. 
But this argument rests on a limited understanding of the bases of compliance at every level of 
social organization. The imposition of sanctions by central governments is not a critical basis of 
compliance with many domestic laws and other prescriptions (Young 1979). Levels of 
compliance are respectably high with regard to the rules of many, though by no means all, 
international regimes. This suggests that we need to think systematically about other bases of 
compliance and the conditions that determine their relevance to various issue areas (Chayes and 
Chayes 1993, Mitchell 1993, Chayes and Chayes 1995). How important is transparency and 
various procedures for monitoring and implementation review that often go with it? What is the 
role of social pressure, in contrast to sanctions imposed by public authorities, as a determinant of 
compliance with international rules? Do feelings of ownership arising from meaningful 
participation in rule-making processes and the sense of legitimacy that such feelings engender 
make a difference when it comes to compliance with the rules? The point of raising these 
questions is not to replace the conventional enforcement/sanctions model of compliance with 
some simple alternative. They indicate, instead, that numerous bases of compliance may operate 
simultaneously or play different roles in various issue areas, so that there is a need for much 
greater sophistication in efforts to explain or predict levels of compliance with the provisions of 
specific regimes. 
* What is the role of non-state actors in the creation and operation of international 
regimes? Despite the arguments presented by those who speak of the emergence of a global civil 
society (Lipschutz 1992, Wapner 1992), there is yet not much evidence for concluding that states 
are losing their place as the dominant (normally sole) members of international regimes. Yet this 
conclusion is not inconsistent with the observation that numerous non-state actors are gaining 
influence not only in processes of regime creation but also in the administration of regimes at the 
international level and the implementation of regimes within municipal forums (Princen and 
Finger, eds., 1994). Non-governmental organizations regularly play important roles in framing 
issues and designing the provisions of international regimes. Increasingly, they are represented 
on national delegations and are allowed to make presentations in their own right during 
negotiations giving rise to new institutions. These organizations have gained access as well to 
many of the commissions and scientific committees established to administer regimes at the 
international level. They loom large in many cases as watchdogs, publicizing non-compliant or 
ambiguous behavior on the part of regime members and bringing pressure to bear on 
international commissions to take their mandates seriously and to confront sensitive issues 
squarely. There is ample evidence to suggest, moreover, that both the desire and the capacity of 
these organizations to intervene in such matters is growing across a wide range of issue areas. 
What this suggests is that we need to set aside sterile arguments about the decline of the nation 
state and the rise of non-state actors and get on with the analysis of the roles non-state actors 
actually play in a society whose membership is still composed largely of states. This should 
increase the subtlety and sophistication of our grasp of international regimes, without requiring 
any fundamental alteration of the basic idea that regimes are social institutions created by states 
to eliminate or alleviate collective-action problems at the international level. 
* How should we deal with institutional linkages among differentiable regimes 
operative in international society? For the most part, analyses of international regimes have 
focused on individual arrangements on the assumption that they are self-contained or stand-alone 
institutions to be studied in isolation from one another. This procedure has obvious attractions 
from the point of view of tractability; it has undoubtedly aided in our initial efforts to understand 
the nature and significance of regimes. Yet it is apparent that institutional linkages are 
widespread - and becoming more so - in international society. Specific regimes are often 
embedded in larger systems of norms and principles, such as the liberal international economic 
order of the postwar period (Ruggie 1983). Individual provisions are regularly nested into 
overarching frameworks, as in the case of substantive protocols set into the context of a broader 
framework agreement. Two or more regimes created for entirely different purposes can intersect 
with each other with far-reaching consequences, as we have come to realize in recent years in the 
context of the environment and trade debate. Just as we have learned to think systematically 
about issue linkages in the creation and operation of individual regimes, therefore, we must now 
turn our attention to institutional linkages. This should help us to understand questions 
concerning such matters as the conditions under which existing regimes spawn additional 
institutions, regimes created for separate purposes interfere with each other's operation, and 
initially unrelated regimes grow together to form larger institutional complexes governing 
relations among groups of actors in international society. 
* How can we move beyond sterile debates between those who see institutions as a 
major driving force in international society and those who see regimes as epiphenomena that 
merely reflect the underlying forces at work? In contrast to those who study other social settings 
where institutions are generally assumed to matter, there is a deep division among students of 
international relations over the issue of the role of regimes as social drivers or what has come to 
be known as the effectiveness of international regimes. It is important to note at the outset that 
this is not an all-or-nothing matter. The institutionalists claim only that regimes account for a 
significant proportion of the variance in collective outcomes at the international level, not that 
they explain everythmg or that other forces including material conditions and ideas are 
insignificant. But beyond this, the essential challenge now is to move from arguments that are 
fundamentally correlational in nature to the establishment of causal connections. What this 
requires is the development and testing of models that spell out the causal mechanisms through 
which the creation and operation of institutions influences the behavior of those actors 
participating in international regimes (Levy and Young 1994). In this way, we can build up a 
body of evidence demonstrating that the links between regime creation and problem solving or 
behavioral change are more than mere spurious correlations. Because the field of international 
relations does not have a unified model of actor behavior, it will be necessary to devise a set of 
models focusing on different behavioral mechanisms in order to make progress toward fulfilling 
this objective. Eventually, it should be possible to integrate these partial models into a more 
comprehensive theory of actor behavior. But this is not essential to the task of moving beyond 
inconclusive debates about the effectiveness of international regimes and developing 
propositions about the relative importance of institutions and other driving forces in the realm of 
international affairs. 
* Can we pinpoint broader consequences flowing from the creation and operation of 
international regimes? Most discussions of the consequences of institutions focus on their ability 
to solve the problems or, more modestly, redirect the behavior that led to their creation. As the 
preceding observations indicate, the analytical challenge of demonstrating effectiveness in this 
sense is great. Even so, it is pertinent to ask whether international regimes have consequences 
extending beyond the problem or issue area to which they apply. We may ask, for example, 
whether institutions play a role in increasing the prominence of some issue areas (for instance, 
human rights and the environment) on the international agenda or in altering some of the 
underlying rules of international society like the prescriptive role of sovereignty. Even more 
broadly, we can inquire into the actual or potential roles institutions play in promoting changes 
in the deep structure of this society (for instance, the rise of non-state actors to positions of real 
influence in international society). Obviously, the causal chains associated with such 
developments are likely to be longer than those involved in more conventional analyses of 
effectiveness, and the interplay of driving forces leading to these developments will always be 
complex. Nonetheless, there is no reason to discount the role of regimes in this connection, 
particularly when we consider the cumulative impact of the growth of international institutions 
across a broad range of issue areas in contrast to examining individual regimes on a case-by-case 
basis. No doubt, decisive conclusions about these underlying issues are a long way off as far as 
the field of international relations is concerned. But this in no way detracts from their 
importance or from the value of getting started on studying them as soon as possible. 
* Do international regimes exhibit identifiable life cycles, and can we develop 
propositions about processes of regime decay? Although regime formation has occupied center 
stage in the field of regime analysis, many observers have noted that regimes change 
continuously over time and that some regimes decline or go out of existence even as others are 
coming on stream. Interestingly, trajectories of regime decay appear to vary greatly. Some 
regimes acquire a life of their own and remain intact long after the forces that produced them 
have dissipated or shifted to other issues. In other cases, regimes that have proved effective for 
relatively long periods collapse quickly as circumstances (often, but not always, involving 
technological developments) change. It is clear, even at this early stage, that regime decay or, 
more broadly, regime change is not some simple function of shifts in the configuration of power 
in the material sense; there is therefore little likelihood that we can explain or predict the course 
of regime change by constructing some index of shifts in the distribution of structural power. 
This may seem disappointing from the point of view of analytic tractability. But it opens up a 
large and important area of inquiry relating to international regimes that has not been pursued 
systematically by students of institutions. Treating institutional change as the dependent variable, 
studies of this kind present attractive opportunities for examining the relative importance of 
material conditions (for example, shifts in population densities or patterns of economic growth) 
and ideas (for instance, the growing concern for anthropogenic change in large natural systems) 
as determinants of regime change. Such studies may also shed light on the extent to which 
regimes themselves are self-maintaining in the sense that they have built in mechanisms 
allowing them to adjust or adapt to changes in the natural and social environments within which 
they operate. 
* How can we combine the insights of the rationalists and the reflexivists (Keohane 
1989) to improve our understanding of international regimes? It is probably fair to say that the 
largest single strand of regime analysis is the work of those who adhere to one variety or another 
of neo-positivism (often called rationalists) in search of generalizations that can be linked to 
empirical observations in a more or less straightforward manner. We belong to this group 
ourselves. Yet it is important to point out that the analysis of international regimes has attracted 
the attention of a number of scholars (sometimes called reflexivists) who bring other approaches 
to knowledge and evidence to this endeavor. This second stream of work includes a variety of 
components, such as the historicism of those who have looked at regimes as path dependent 
constructs, the linguistic and legal analyses of those who have endeavored to sort out different 
types of rules, and the critical theory of those who see regimes as expressions of larger social 
forces at work in human affairs (Keeley 1990, Hurrell 1993, Kratochwil 1993). Taken together, 
the contributions of these reflexivist scholars have added a number of dimensions to our 
understanding of the nature and role of institutions in international society. The challenge 
confronting us now is to devise methods for drawing on both of these streams of analysis in the 
interests of developing a deeper understanding of international regimes than either body of work 
alone can support. This will not be an easy task. Not only is it difficult to frame the findings of 
the rationalists in reflexivist terms and vice versa, but there is also a tendency on the part of both 
groups to disparage the contributions of the other. Yet the future of regime analysis may well 
turn in considerable measure on our ability to find the language and analytic procedures needed 
to bridge this gap. 
* Can we derive design principles from the study of international regimes that will 
prove useful to practitioners responsible for creating or restructuring such institutional 
arrangements? The appeal of translating the findings of regime analysis into design principles is 
easy to understand. It provides scholars with the satisfaction of feeling that their work is relevant 
to the world of social policy. Equally important, it makes the world of research useful to 
policymakers and offers a justification for continuing to support the endeavors of scholars. Yet 
the gap between regime analysis in its current form and the design of specific international 
institutions is wide. Partly, this is a matter of the presence of sharp differences of opinion among 
students of regimes and the resultant lack of consensus within this community on the 
formulation of powerful generalizations. In part, it is a consequence of the contingent nature of 
most propositions about the creation and operation of international regimes. What this means is 
that conclusions drawn from one set of cases or from one issue area frequently fail to generalize 
to others, and analysts are seldom in a position to make clear predictions regarding the 
consequences likely to flow from the choice of specific institutional arrangements to deal with 
current problems. To this we must add that the creation of regimes in international society 
normally involves the give-and-take of institutional bargaining, so that the institutions that 
emerge are hybrid arrangements arising from deals made in the interests of reaching closure in 
the bargaining process. Although hybrid vigor may be a common phenomenon in other realms, 
there is no basis for expecting such mixed arrangements to produce particularly desirable 
outcomes in the realm of international institutions. Nonetheless, we cannot and should not 
abandon the search for usable design principles in the analysis of international regimes. The case 
for combining theory and praxis in this field of analysis is compelling both from the perspective 
of those seeking to add to our knowledge of international institutions and from the vantage point 
of those responsible to creating and operating them. 
To conclude, we offer some brief observations regarding the relationship between 
this survey of regime analysis and the creation of the regimes database that led us to undertake 
this assessment in the first place. The dominant methodology among students of international 
regimes features the conduct of structured and focused case studies. Such studies have the virtue 
of providing empirically grounded and detailed accounts of actual regimes. But they leave much 
to be desired in terms of the generalizability of their findings. For the most part, the cases chosen 
for analysis do not constitute representative samples of the larger universe of international 
regimes. In many instances, there are legitimate concerns regarding the influence of selection 
bias in the choice of cases. This makes it difficult to conduct natural experiments featuring 
comparisons of situations with and without regimes; it virtually precludes studies focusing on 
variance in the classificatory variables we outlined in Section 2 of this essay. 
What is needed to alleviate this problem is a database containing comparable 
information on a growing collection of regimes. The development of such a database must begin 
with clear and uniform criteria for identifying regimes, so that we can be sure we are dealing 
with a well-defined universe of cases that are homogeneous with regard to their defining 
characteristics. We must then proceed to add a set of variables that are conceptually consistent in 
the sense that key concepts are used in the same way by all those contributing to the database 
and that are calibrated in the sense that procedures for taking readings on these variables are 
uniform. Building such a database can play a critical role in pursuing the science agenda set 
forth in the preceding pages; the research program outlined here will also contribute to the 
continuing growth of the database. To be sure, this effort is most relevant to the research agenda 
of those who operate within the realm of neo-positivism broadly construed. This is a significant 
limitation; we must not allow the development of a regimes database to deflect our attention 
from the need to find ways to integrate the contributions of the rationalists and the reflexivists. 
In the realm of empirically-grounded efforts to construct generalizations or to probe causal 
mechanisms, however, the regimes database should become a powerful and widely used tool in 
efforts to expand our understanding of the role of institutions in coping with difficult 
international problems. 
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